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Microsimulation and Policy Analysis  
Non-technical summary 
This paper is prepared as a chapter forthcoming in the Handbook of Income Distribution, 
Volume 2 (edited by A. B. Atkinson and F. Bourguignon, Elsevier-North Holland). 
Microsimulation methods are increasingly used to study the effects of policies on the income 
distribution contributing both to policy debates and academic literature. In general terms, 
microsimulation refers to modelling changes in the state or behaviour of micro-level units. 
We provide an overview of approaches that address questions related to the impact of tax-
benefit policies on household income distribution.  
We first discuss how microsimulation modelling contributes to the analysis of the income 
distribution more broadly, pointing out that it can enrich survey and administrative data by 
checking its consistency, adding further details and enhancing analytical flexibility. In 
addition, it provides the basis for calculating indicators that cannot otherwise be estimated 
directly from micro-data such as measures of work incentives, net support for children and 
automatic stabilisers embedded in tax-benefit systems. 
We then focus more specifically on the role of microsimulation in policy evaluation. Tax-
benefit models can provide information on household disposable income and its components 
under various policy scenarios and as such constitute a unique tool for ex ante policy 
analysis, though equally can be used for ex post analysis. We review the formal framework 
underlying such microsimulation-based decomposition analysis of income distribution and 
suggest a broader perspective to accommodate a wider range of applications. Our main 
emphasis is on static modelling methods, though we also consider extensions accounting for 
behavioural reactions and links with macroeconomic models. As microsimulation models are 
often concerned with current and future policies, we discuss various approaches to predict the 
income distribution given that data providing information on the current situation becomes 
available with a time lag, distinguishing between nowcasting and forecasting.  
We emphasise the role of comparative analysis as cross-country differences in tax-benefit 
systems and population structures provide a basis to assess the robustness of results and 
generalise conclusions. We provide empirical illustrations drawing mainly on analysis using 
the EU-wide tax-benefit model EUROMOD. Covering 27 countries and made generally 
accessible this is now one of the most widely used models.  
There are many remaining challenges to providing estimates of the effects of policy and 
policy changes that can be used with confidence within policy analysis and we consider three 
major issues: reconciling the simulated income distribution and that measured using the 
original micro-data; accounting for benefit non take-up and tax non-compliance, as well as 
validating and assessing the statistical reliability of microsimulation estimates. 
While our main focus is on the distribution of household disposable income and its 
components at the national level, we also discuss approaches which extend the scope of 
modelling in various dimensions. We review attempts to obtain a broader measure of income 
by including non-cash benefits and indirect taxes; highlight the main modelling features of 
dynamic (longitudinal) modelling to capture long-term impacts of policies; and consider the 
use of microsimulation to explore the effects of policies at sub- and supra-national level. 
We conclude by summarising our view of the achievements of microsimulation for policy 
analysis to date and by exploring the outlook for future developments along two dimensions: 
the need for data improvements and methodological developments; and the need to consider 
ways to organise development, maintenance and access to microsimulation models for policy 
analysis purposes. 
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1. Introduction and overview 
1.1. What is microsimulation?  
Microsimulation methods are increasingly used to evaluate the effects of policies on the 
income distribution. Microsimulation is a term used to describe a wide variety of modelling 
techniques that all operate at the level of individual units (such as persons, firms or vehicles) 
to which a set of rules is applied to simulate changes in state or behaviour. These rules may 
be deterministic or stochastic, with the result being an estimate of the outcomes of applying 
these rules, possibly over many steps and taking account of many interactions. These 
estimates are also at the micro-level, allowing analysis of the distribution of the outcomes and 
changes to them, as well as the calculation of any relevant aggregate.1  
Microsimulation models in the social sciences were pioneered in the 1950s by Guy Orcutt 
and his colleagues as a new approach to analysing the impact of social and economic policies 
which took account of the characteristics and behaviour of the micro-level units under 
investigation (Orcutt, 1957; Orcutt et al., 1961). Microsimulation is commonly applied to 
many areas of public policy-relevance such as, for example, transportation, the location 
planning for public services and commercial developments, and demand for health care and 
long-term care.2 The microsimulation approaches considered here are those that primarily 
address questions related to the impact of tax-benefit policies on income distribution. Models 
simulating the effects of social and fiscal policies on household income were first developed 
in the 1980s when the essential inputs – micro-data from household surveys and accessible 
computing power – began to be made available.  
                                                 
1
 Adapted from the definition provided by the International Microsimulation Association 
(http://microsimulation.org/). Broadly speaking, microsimulation modelling could also cover agent-based 
simulation (ABS), though they have remained very distinct fields in the literature with microsimulation methods 
drawing heavily on micro-data (Spielauer, 2011). 
2
 There are extensive literatures covering each area. See for example Dowling et al. (2004), Waddell et al. 
(2003) and Gupta and Harding (2007).  
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These early tax-benefit microsimulation models were arithmetic, re-calculating the 
components of household disposable income (usually cash benefits, direct taxes and social 
contributions) for each household in a representative micro-dataset under different sets of 
policy rules. They could answer “what if” questions about the effects of specific policy 
reforms on each household’s income and hence on the overall income distribution, and on the 
aggregate public budget. Some early studies include Atkinson et al. (1983) and Betson et al. 
(1982). They could also readily be used to calculate indicators of work incentives on the 
intensive margin (Atkinson and Sutherland, 1989; Bourguignon et al., 1993). Since then this 
“static” modelling approach has not only proliferated but also been refined in a number of 
directions with developments in data availability, methodology, speed and capacity of 
accessible computing power and the demands made by policy making and policy analysis 
each playing a role.  
Microsimulation models are often categorised as “static”, “dynamic” or “behavioural” (see 
for example, Harding 1996a). The first type applies purely deterministic policy rules on 
micro-data in combination with data adjustments such as re-weighting. The characteristics of 
the micro units stay constant. Dynamic models, on the other hand, “age” the micro units 
through time, changing their characteristics in response to natural processes and the 
probabilities of relevant events and transitions (Li and O’Donoghue, 2013). Behavioural 
models use micro-econometric models of individual preferences to estimate the effects of 
policy changes on behaviour, often in terms of labour supply. In practice the distinction 
between modelling approaches is no longer necessarily useful as much modern 
microsimulation analysis combines elements of each type, according to the question being 
addressed. For example, labour supply models require the calculation of budget sets 
(household income under alternative labour supply scenarios) for individuals and these are 
usually generated by static tax-benefit models. Behavioural reactions, as well as static 
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calculations, are relevant in dynamic micro-simulations. In seeking to simulate the effects of 
policy changes in a variety of economic environments, so-called static models may borrow 
elements of dynamic model methodology and in seeking to simplify the dynamic modelling 
process, the reverse can also be true (Caldwell, 1990). Dynamic models in practice mainly 
address questions about the effects of policies that take time to evolve such as pensions (e.g. 
Borella and Coda Moscarola, 2010; Dekkers et al., 2010; Flood, 2007) and long term care 
reform (e.g. Hancock, 2000; Hancock et al., 2013), often focusing on the cost, gainers and 
losers, as well as questions about intra-personal redistribution over the lifecycle (Harding, 
1993).  
Without tax-benefit microsimulation modelling, and before it was widespread, analysis of the 
effects of taxes and benefits on household income, and calculation of work incentive 
indicators, was limited to “model family” calculations for stylised households, sometimes 
referred to as “tax-benefit models”. These calculations, still carried out by the OECD for the 
purpose of making cross-country comparisons (OECD, 2012), although useful for 
understanding the net effects of policies in particular standardised cases, are not informative 
about the impact on the income distribution.  
The aim of this chapter is to provide an overview of microsimulation approaches to explore 
the effects of policy on the income distribution, and highlight some particular state-of-the-art 
or innovative studies that have been carried out. The main emphasis is on static modelling 
methods, though we also consider extensions accounting for behavioural reactions (section 
3.3) and highlight the main modelling features of dynamic modelling (section 5.2), referring 
to the existing reviews. We have not attempted a comprehensive review of the models 
themselves. Their proliferation would make such a task not only daunting, but quickly out-of-
date. There are already a number of reviews and collections describing both models and 
analysis using them, a selection of which we summarise below.  
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1.2. Microsimulation in the economic literature 
There are several distinct motivations for using a microsimulation model to simulate the 
impact of a given policy on the income distribution. Microsimulation can be used to quantify 
the role of existing policies on income inequality or poverty in a given context. More 
importantly, it is a tool to aid the design of new policies with particular objectives and to 
evaluate actual or proposed reforms in dimensions that were not taken into account in the 
original design. Moreover, it can also be used to show how alternative approaches could 
result in better outcomes in some respect. From a practical policy perspective, one of the 
main uses of microsimulation modelling for the design of policy by policymakers is to assess 
the approximate budgetary cost of a new policy given its objectives, e.g. the desire to reduce 
the poverty gap or to increase work incentives for particular groups. Such analysis rarely sees 
the light of day except in its final form: as a costed reform proposal.  
Evidence from microsimulation modelling is also used to inform academic economic debates 
about the impact of policy reforms and the optimal design of policy (Blundell, 2012). In 
general terms, a microsimulation approach allows the research to conduct a “controlled 
experiment” by changing the parameters of interest while holding everything else constant 
and avoiding endogeneity problems in identifying the direct effects of the policy under 
analysis (Bourguignon and Spadaro, 2006). The use of tax-benefit microsimulation models to 
calculate counterfactual states and scenarios underpins much micro-economic analysis of the 
causal impact of fiscal policy reforms. A prime example is the use of the Institute of Fiscal 
Studies tax-benefit microsimulation model, TAXBEN for the UK, to provide empirical 
evidence for the arguments about tax design put forward in the authoritative Mirrlees Review 
(2010). Moreover, the counterfactuals shed light on the potential ingredients of optimal tax 
analysis which cannot be derived in a quasi-experimental setting. This is demonstrated by the 
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developments of the computational optimal income taxation theory, applied by Aaberge and 
Colombino (2013) to Norway and Blundell and Shepard (2012) to the UK.  
Microsimulation modelling is increasingly recognised as part of the policy evaluation 
literature, where it is one of the key ingredients of a careful, evidence-based evaluation of the 
design of tax-benefit reforms. While this literature in general has been more focused on ex-
post analysis, Keane (2010) and Blundell (2012), among others, have underlined the need to 
consider both ex-ante and ex-post approaches to study the effects of policy changes. In this 
context, tax-benefit microsimulation models can offer insights in two ways. First, they are the 
unique tool to conduct ex-ante analysis through the simulation of the counterfactual scenarios 
reflecting alternative policy regimes. Such counterfactuals are needed both for the “morning-
after” evaluation of tax-benefit reforms and for more complex structural models which reveal 
individual behavioural changes based on simulated budget constraints and an estimated 
model of individual and family choices (see section 3.3). Second, by developing a 
counterfactual scenario, tax-benefit microsimulation models enable the researcher to 
disentangle ex-post what would have happened without a given policy. Although ex-post 
analysis is typically conducted by means of quasi-experimental approaches, based on 
difference-in-difference, matching and selection estimators, the cross-fertilisation between 
ex-ante and ex-post approaches has contributed to the increasing credibility of analysis based 
on detailed microsimulation models, making them a core part of the causal policy evaluation 
literature. A prime example is the quasi-experimental analysis used to validate structural 
models of labour supply which use microsimulation models to derive the budget sets faced by 
individuals (see, among others, Blundell, 2006). 
Furthermore, microsimulation features in the strand of literature that involves micro-macro 
linkage, aiming to measure the effects of macro-economic changes (including macro-
economic policy) on the income distribution. More specifically, the linkage of 
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microsimulation models to macro-economic models allows one to consider the interactions of 
macroeconomic policies or shocks with the tax-benefit systems (see section 3.4). Ignoring the 
tax-benefit policy effects on income distribution can be justifiable in some circumstances, for 
example when analysing their impact in developing countries because they may be very 
limited in size and reform to social expenditures or macro-economic shocks could be much 
more relevant for re-distribution, but it is more problematic in the context of mature welfare 
states (Bourguignon and Bussolo, 2013).  
The literature on microsimulation has expanded enormously in the last twenty years along 
with the spread and development of this methodology. An attempt to cover all relevant 
publications would be a daunting task and, therefore, we aim to provide some of the most 
important methodological references with relevant illustrations in the rest of this chapter. For 
further and broader material, we refer the reader to a number of reviews and workshop and 
conference volumes which provide good surveys, both of applications of models and of 
models themselves, and reflect well how the state-of-art modelling has evolved since the 
beginning of the 1990s: Harding (1996b), Gupta and Kapur (2000), Mitton et al. (2000), 
Gupta and Harding (2007), Harding and Gupta (2007), Lelkes and Sutherland (2009), Zaidi et 
al. (2009), Dekkers et al. (2014), O’Donoghue (2014).3 For surveys of models themselves, 
see Merz (1991), Sutherland (1995), Klevmarken (1997), Gupta and Kapur (2000), 
O’Donoghue (2001), Zaidi and Rake (2001), Gupta and Harding (2007), Urzúa (2012), Li 
and O’Donoghue (2013). In addition, there are several books focusing on specific models, as 
such providing excellent examples of opening the ‘black box’ often associated with complex 
economic models. For example, Harding (1993) describes the details of her dynamic cohort 
microsimulation model used to evaluate lifetime income distribution and redistribution for 
Australia, Redmond et al. (1998) provide an extensive discussion of inner workings of 
                                                 
3
 For older conference volumes and reviews, see literature references given in these collections.  
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POLIMOD, a static tax-benefit model for the UK, and Bargain (2007) offers a collection of 
applications using EUROMOD, the EU tax-benefit model. Furthermore, the microsimulation 
community established the International Microsimulation Association (IMA) in 2005 and 
since 2007 it has been possible to follow the latest developments in the field with the 
International Journal of Microsimulation, a refereed online journal published under the 
auspices of the IMA.4  
1.3. Summary of chapter  
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. Before getting into the ways in which 
microsimulation can be used to understand the effects of policy changes, section 2 describes 
how it can also be useful in improving the existing information available for the analysis of 
income distribution and re-distribution. Simulated estimates of tax liability and benefit 
entitlement can be used alongside the values recorded in survey and administrative micro-
datasets, to understand and improve on the deficiencies in the latter (e.g. to impute gross 
income from net if the former is not available or measured satisfactorily in the source data). 
Furthermore, indicators that cannot be collected in surveys or through administrative 
processes but are of value in understanding the relationships between policy and income 
distribution, such as indicators of work incentives, can be calculated using microsimulation 
models.  
Throughout the chapter we provide some empirical illustrations drawing mainly on analysis 
using the EU-wide tax-benefit model EUROMOD (Sutherland and Figari, 2013). Covering 
27 countries and made generally accessible this is now one of the most widely used models. 
We have chosen to highlight EUROMOD at least partly because it is generally available to 
                                                 
4
 See http://www.microsimulation.org/ijm/   
11 
 
use, and readers can relatively easily reproduce, update and extend the examples of analysis 
included in this chapter. More information about EUROMOD is provided in Box 1.  
The primary motivation for building a tax-benefit microsimulation model is to be able to 
analyse the effects of policy changes on income distribution. Section 3 starts with a 
description of the basic process and explains the need to carry out micro-level calculations in 
order to capture the effects due to the complexity of tax-benefit systems. However, in any 
microsimulation analysis there are choices over which dimensions to focus on and which to 
hold constant. Most studies do not set out their specific choices in formal terms. Section 3.2 
provides a formal framework applicable to most tax-benefit microsimulation analysis. The 
following four sub-sections focus on some of the major and commonly-applied extensions to 
the basic approach. Section 3.3 discusses how individual behavioural responses to policy 
changes are estimated and focuses particularly on labour supply responses. This is followed 
in section 3.4 by a review of the ways changes in income distribution can be linked to 
macroeconomic processes. Section 3.5 covers the use of microsimulation, in conjunction with 
macro-level statistics or forecasts, to provide estimates of income distribution for periods 
beyond those covered by the latest micro-data. These projections might be for the current 
situation (“nowcasting”) or sometime in the future (forecasting). Finally, section 3.6 focuses 
on the ways in which microsimulation can be used to inform cross-country comparisons of 
the effects of policies.  
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Box 1: EUROMOD – a tax-benefit microsimulation model 
EUROMOD is the tax-benefit microsimulation model of the European Union. It simulates 
individual and household tax liabilities and cash benefit entitlements according to the policy 
rules in place, and reforms to them, in each member state. It has two main distinguishing 
features. First, it covers many countries within the same framework enabling a wide range 
of applications and comparability of results. Generally, EUROMOD is much more flexible 
than national microsimulation models in order to ensure consistency of results and 
transferability of tax-benefit system components across countries. Secondly, it is intended 
to be openly accessible: use is not restricted to the owners of the model. These special 
features justify our use of EUROMOD analysis to provide many of our empirical illustrations. 
The calculations carried out by EUROMOD for any one country are in other respects quite 
typical of all tax-benefit microsimulation models, at least for developed countries. The 
description below is therefore generally applicable.  
EUROMOD combines information on policy rules with detailed and nationally representative 
micro-data on individual and household circumstances drawn from household income 
surveys and other data sources. The rules for each policy instrument are applied 
arithmetically to the characteristics of each individual, resulting in the amount of tax liability 
or benefit entitlement. For example, in the case of the simplest universal child benefit, the 
number of children within the eligible age range in the family is counted and the benefit 
amount per child is multiplied by this number to give the family’s entitlement. Further 
issues complicate the calculation: “child” and “family” need to be defined and the 
interaction of the child benefit amount with the rest of the tax-benefit system needs to be 
accounted for. This illustrative calculation is taken further in Appendix A by considering the 
effects of a change in policy. The two alternative child benefit entitlements and resulting 
measures of household disposable income can be compared.  
The results of the calculations for each household are stored at the micro level and can be 
analysed with any statistical software. At their simplest they may be weighted to population 
level and the weighted change in income can be added up to provide an estimate of the 
budgetary effect of the policy change, or it can be analysed in relation to any characteristics 
provided in the data: for example to show the proportion of households gaining and losing 
by income quantile, region or household type. The micro-outputs from alternative policy or 
labour market scenarios can also be used as the basis for calculating indicators of work 
incentives or for modeling changes in labour supply or other behavior.  
EUROMOD aims to simulate as much as possible of the tax and benefit components of 
household disposable income and generally, the following instruments are simulated: 
income taxes, social insurance contributions, family benefits, housing benefits, social 
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assistance and other income-related benefits. Instruments which are not simulated are 
taken directly from the data. These include most contributory benefits and pensions (due to 
the lack of information on previous employment and contribution history) and disability 
benefits (because of the need to know the nature and severity of the disability, which is also 
not present in the data).  
EUROMOD input data for most countries are derived from the European Union Statistics on 
Income and Living Conditions (EU-SILC). In common with most sources of micro-data used as 
input into microsimulation models, the EU-SILC was not designed for this purpose (Figari et 
al., 2007). A significant amount of preparation of the data, including imputing necessary 
information that is missing, needs to be done. For example, if gross income values are not 
directly recorded during the data collection operations and are imputed in an unsatisfactory 
way, a net-to-gross procedure is applied to the net income variables in order to derive the 
gross values used in the policy simulation.  
EUROMOD includes some simple adjustments for the non take-up of some benefits and 
evasion of taxes in some countries. In common with other adjustments and assumptions 
(e.g. the updating of non-simulated incomes to a more recent point in time than the data 
income reference point) these can be changed or “switched off” by the user, depending on 
the analysis being done.  
Baseline systems in EUROMOD have been validated and tested at micro level (i.e. case-by-
case validation) and macro level. For each system simulated in EUROMOD Country Reports 
are available on the EUROMOD web pages with background information on the tax-benefit 
system(s), a detailed description of all tax-benefit components simulated, a general 
overview of the input data and an extended summary of the validation process. 
For more information about EUROMOD and its applications, see the official website 
(https://www.iser.essex.ac.uk/euromod) and Sutherland and Figari (2013).  
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Of course, there are many remaining challenges to providing estimates of the effects of policy 
and policy changes that can be used with confidence within policy analysis, and Section 4 
considers three major ones. First, section 4.1 considers the issues about reconciling the 
simulated income distribution and that measured using the original micro-data (from surveys 
particularly, but also administrative sources). A major difference between the two 
distributions can undermine confidence in microsimulation results but has a number of inter-
related causes, some of which can point to problems in survey data (e.g. income under-
reporting), and can be mitigated using information from simulations, and others which cannot 
(e.g. small and unrepresentative samples of high income earners). Simulations can over-
estimate income if the non-take-up of benefits is not accounted for and also distorted if there 
is tax evasion. These issues, and how they may be accounted for in microsimulation models, 
are discussed in section 4.2. Finally it is important that the reliability of microsimulation 
estimates is possible to ascertain. This applies both in terms of how well point estimates 
match up to information from other sources (“validation”) and the need for statistical 
reliability indicators that can be applied to microsimulation estimates. Section 4.3 considers 
these issues.  
While the main focus of this chapter is the contribution to policy analysis of (direct) tax and 
(cash) benefit microsimulation of household incomes at the national level at a given point in 
time, section 5 considers a somewhat broader scope, in some dimensions. Section 5.1 
discusses a broadening of the outcome income measure to include the effect of non-cash 
benefits and, particularly, indirect taxes. Section 5.2 reviews the main features of dynamic 
microsimulation models, used in analysing the long-term redistributive effects of policies and 
the incidence of tax-benefit systems over the lifetime rather than cross-sectionally at a point 
in time. Section 5.3 discusses the use of microsimulation to explore the effects of policies at a 
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lower level than that of the nation (e.g. Spanish regions or US states) and at a higher level 
(e.g. the European Union, or world regions such as southern Africa).  
The final section concludes by first summarising our view of the achievements of 
microsimulation for policy analysis to date, and then by exploring the outlook for the future 
along two dimensions: the need for data improvements and methodological developments; 
and the need to consider ways to organise development, maintenance and access to 
microsimulation models for policy analysis purposes.  
2. What does microsimulation add to analysis of the income distribution 
and re-distribution?  
2.1. Enriching existing micro-data 
While the most obvious application of the microsimulation method is assessing the effects of 
tax-benefit policy changes on income distribution, it can be also useful for analysing the 
existing income distribution and redistribution. Compared to research on income distribution 
utilising only survey or administrative data directly, fiscal microsimulation can complement 
and improve such analysis by (i) adding further information, (ii) checking the consistency of 
the collected data, and (iii) allowing for greater flexibility with respect to the unit of analysis. 
2.1.1. Adding information 
Simulations allow data to be generated which may be difficult or too expensive to collect 
directly or accurately from individuals. A common use of microsimulation in the processing 
of income survey data is deriving gross incomes from the net values that are collected, or vice 
versa. Compared to other methods such as statistical imputation, this takes into account the 
full details of the tax-benefit rules that are applicable for a given individual or household. 
Hence it provides more accurate results, but may also require more effort to develop and keep 
16 
 
up-to-date. Specific microsimulation routines are often built for this purpose. Among others 
see Betti et al. (2011) on the Siena Microsimulation Model which is used for conversions 
between net and gross income variables for several countries in the European Union Statistics 
on Income and Living Conditions (EU-SILC) survey and Jenkins (2011) on the derivations of 
net income variables for the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS).  
Such gross-to-net conversion routines naturally follow the logic of full-scale tax-benefit 
models, though may still have notable differences. For example, tax-benefit models typically 
deal with the final tax liability (i.e. aiming to account for all tax concessions and considering 
the total taxable income) while taxes withheld on specific income sources are often more 
relevant for gross/net adjustments in a survey. For net-to-gross conversions, there are two 
microsimulation-related approaches. One is to apply inverted statutory tax rules and the other 
to use gross-to-net routines in an iterative procedure to search for the corresponding gross 
value for a given net income, as suggested in Immervoll and O’Donoghue (2001). The first 
approach can be more straightforward if tax rules are relatively simple and analytical 
inversion is feasible, while the second approach allows the use of already existing tax-benefit 
models. The latter approach has also been used in the Siena model and related applications, 
e.g. Rodrigues (2007).  
If a tax-benefit model is applied to income data which contain imputed gross values, it is 
important to ensure that the net-to-gross conversion is consistent with the tax-benefit model 
calculations as otherwise simulated net incomes will not match the observed values. This 
source of bias is easy to overlook and consistency often difficult to establish as the 
documentation of net-to-gross derivations carried out by survey data providers often lacks 
sufficient details for tax-benefit modelling purposes. 
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Microsimulation methods can be also used to obtain more detailed tax information compared 
to what is usually available in the surveys (if any at all). For example, the Current Population 
Survey (CPS), one of the main household surveys in the US, provides such information 
through the Annual Social and Economic Supplement (ASEC) which includes simulated 
direct taxes and imputed employer’s contributions for health insurance (Cleveland, 2005). 
Alternatively, surveys could be combined with detailed tax information from administrative 
records, though in practice this is still underdeveloped due to limitations on access to 
administrative records. Furthermore, microsimulation models can extend the scope of income 
information by simulating employer social insurance contributions and indirect taxes which 
are usually not captured in income (and expenditure) surveys, even though their economic 
incidence is typically considered to be borne by individuals (Fullerton and Metcalf, 2002) and 
hence relevant for welfare analysis.  
Although benefit information tends to be more detailed in income surveys, there are 
applications where microsimulation methods can still provide further insights. Specifically, 
microsimulation allows the assessment of the intended effect of transfers (by calculating 
benefit eligibility) and contrast it with reported outcome (i.e. observed benefit receipt), which 
is influenced by individual compliance behaviour (see more in section 4.2) and the 
effectiveness of benefit administrations, among other factors.  
Overall, it is of course possible to carry out analysis of the redistributive effect of taxes and 
benefits only using survey information directly. For example, Mahler and Jesuit (2006) and 
Wang et al. (2012) use household survey data from the Luxembourg Income Study (LIS) to 
analyse redistributive effects in the OECD countries and Fuest et al. (2010) and Atta-Darkua 
and Barnard (2010) use the SILC data for EU countries. However, microsimulation methods 
can often add to the scope and detail of the analysis, e.g. Immervoll et al. (2006a), Paulus et 
al. (2009), Jara and Tumino (2013) use tax and benefit data simulated with EUROMOD for 
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EU countries, and Kim and Lambert (2009) analyse redistribution in the US on the basis of 
the CPS/ASEC. Wagstaff et al. (1999) specifically analyse the progressivity of personal 
income taxes in the OECD countries using also the LIS data, while Verbist and Figari (2014) 
carry out similar analysis for EU countries relying on EUROMOD simulations, allowing 
them to extend the analysis with social insurance contributions as well. Piketty and Saez 
(2007) use the TAXSIM5 model to compute US federal individual income taxes and analyse 
their progressivity. Furthermore, Verbist (2007) employs EUROMOD to consider the 
distribution and redistributive effects of replacement incomes taking into account interactions 
with taxes and social contributions, and Hungerford (2010) uses simulations to examine 
certain federal tax provisions and transfer programs in the US. Decoster and Van Camp 
(2001), O’Donoghue et al. (2004) and Decoster et al. (2010) are examples of studies 
simulating and analysing the effects of indirect taxes across the distribution of income.  
Microsimulation can help to detect inconsistencies and potential measurement errors in the 
existing data. An obvious example is cross-checking whether gross and net income values (if 
both are reported) correspond to each other (see section 2.1.1). As benefit income tends to be 
underreported in survey data (Lynn et al., 2012; Meyer et al. 2009), use of simulated benefits 
has the potential to improve the accuracy of income information (see more in section 4.1). 
However, it needs to be born in mind that the quality of input data is also critical for the 
simulated results themselves and there could be other reasons for discrepancies between 
observed and simulated income apart from underreporting (see Figari et al., 2012a). 
                                                 
5
 TAXSIM is the NBER microsimulation model that calculates US federal and states income taxes 
(http://www.nber.org/taxsim/). It covers the federal tax system from 1960 and the state systems from 1977 up to 
the current year. Model calculations are done in the TAXSIM server on the basis of survey data provided by the 
users in the required format containing different sources of income, deductions and personal characteristics used 
to calculate tax liabilities. The program, written in FORTRAN, reads the input data sent by the user through a 
web application, calculates tax liabilities and loads the results on the user’s computer. Recent applications are 
based on the March Current Population Survey, the Survey of Consumer Finance, the Consumer Expenditure 
Survey and the Panel Study of Income Dynamics, and a library of scripts used to derive the input data from 
different sources is made available by previous users. See Feenberg and Coutts (1993) for more information. 
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2.1.2. The unit of analysis 
Microsimulation can also offer some flexibility in the choice of unit of analysis. In any 
analysis of distribution, the unit of measurement is an important issue. Income is often 
measured at the household level, aggregating all sources across all individuals. Income 
surveys may not facilitate analysis at a lower level (e.g. aggregating within the narrow family 
or the fiscal unit) because some or all income variables are provided only at the household 
level. This is the case, for example, for the micro-data provided by Eurostat from the 
European Statistics on Income and Living Conditions (EU-SILC). However, considering the 
effect of policy on the incomes of sub-units within households may be relevant in a number 
of ways. The assumption of complete within-household sharing of resources deserves to be 
questioned, and its implications made clear. For example, assessments of poverty risk among 
pension recipients might look quite different if it were not assumed that they shared this 
income with co-resident younger generations, and vice versa. Furthermore, it may be 
particularly relevant to consider the effects of policy in terms of the particular unit of 
assessment, rather than the household as a whole. Minimum income schemes use a variety of 
units over which to assess income and eligibility and these are often narrower than the survey 
household. A flexible microsimulation model is able to operate using a range of units of 
analysis as well as units of assessment and aggregation, since they are able to assign income 
components, or shares of them, to the relevant recipient units within the household. Examples 
of microsimulation studies that consider units of analysis apart from the household are 
Decoster and Van Camp (2000) in relation to tax incidence at the household or fiscal unit 
level, Figari et al. (2011a) who analyse income within couples, and Bennett and Sutherland 
(2011) who consider the implications of means-testing at family-unit level for receipt of 
benefit income by individuals.  
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2.2. Microsimulation-based indicators  
The microsimulation method is also used to construct various indicators to measure the extent 
to which household disposable income reacts to changes in gross earnings or individual or 
household characteristics through interactions with the tax-benefit system. The two main 
groups of such indicators reflect individual work incentives and automatic adjustment 
mechanisms built into fiscal systems. This subsection gives an overview of these indicators 
and provides some examples, while a more formal presentation can be found in section 3.2.  
2.2.1. Indicators of work incentives 
Marginal effective tax rates and participation tax rates are indicators of work incentives for 
the intensive (i.e. work effort) and the extensive labour supply margin (i.e. decision to work), 
respectively. Marginal effective tax rates (METR) reflect the financial incentive for a 
working person to increase his work contribution marginally either through longer hours or 
higher productivity (increasing the hourly wage rate). They show the proportion of additional 
earnings which is taxed away, taking into account not only the personal income tax but also 
social contributions as well as interactions with benefits, e.g. withdrawal of means-tested 
benefits as private income increases. As such, METRs indicate more accurately the actual tax 
burden on additional income compared to statutory marginal income tax rates. Given that 
taxes and benefits form a complex non-linear system, it is usually not feasible to obtain 
METRs in the form of analytical derivatives of the overall tax-benefit function. Instead, 
METRs are estimated empirically by incrementing gross earnings of an employed person by 
a small margin (e.g. 1% to 5%) and re-calculating disposable income, see Immervoll (2004), 
Adam et al. (2006b), Jara and Tumino (2013). Figure 1 provides an example from the last of 
these showing the extent to which average METRs and their distributions vary across the 
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European Union.6 The scope of these calculations is usually limited to direct taxes and (cash) 
benefits and current work incentives, though there are also extensions accounting for 
consumption taxes and taking a life-cycle labour supply perspective, see Kotlikoff and 
Rapson (2007). Graphically, METRs can be illustrated with a budget constraint chart which 
plots net income against gross earnings (or hours worked), see e.g. Adam et al. (2006b) and 
Morawski and Myck (2010), as the slope of this line corresponds to 1 −, i.e. the 
proportion of additional gross earnings retained by the individual.  
Figure 1. Marginal effective tax rates across the EU, 2007 (%) 
 
Notes: Countries are ranked by median METR. Source: Jara and Tumino (2013) using EUROMOD.  
Participation tax rates (PTR) are conceptually very similar, indicating the effective tax rate on 
the extensive margin, i.e. the proportion of earnings paid as taxes and lost due to benefit 
                                                 
6
 In Figure 1 and elsewhere we use the official country acronyms for the EU countries. These are (using the 
official country ordering): Belgium (BE), Bulgaria (BG), Czech Republic (CZ), Denmark (DK), Germany (DE), 
Estonia (EE), Ireland (IE), Greece (EL), Spain (ES), France (FR), Italy (IT), Cyprus (CY), Latvia (LV), 
Lithuania (LT), Luxembourg (LU), Hungary (HU), Malta (MT), Netherlands (NL), Austria (AT), Poland (PL), 
Portugal (PT), Romania (RO), Slovenia (SI), Slovakia (SK), Finland (FI), Sweden (SE), United Kingdom (UK).   
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withdrawal if a person moves from inactivity or unemployment to work. METRs and PTRs 
are typically between 0% and 100%, with higher rates implying weaker incentives to work 
(more). Because of non-linearities and complex interactions in the tax-benefit systems, 
however, individuals facing greater than 100% (or negative) tax rates may be also found. 
These often expose unintended effects built into the tax-benefit system. More generally, 
relatively high values indicate situations which can constrain labour supply and trap people at 
certain income/employment levels. Marginal effective tax rates and participation tax rates are 
hence useful indicators to assess whether the tax-benefit system may limit employment for 
certain individuals. These are also central parameters in assessing optimal tax design, see 
Immervoll et al. (2007) and Brewer et al. (2010) for empirical applications. Figure 1 
illustrates how in many countries there is a considerable spread in the value of the METRs 
even before considering the extremes of the distributions. This demonstrates how an analysis 
using work incentive indicators based on calculations for average or representative cases may 
be quite misleading. 
Replacement rates (RR) complement participation tax rates, showing the level of out-of-work 
income relative to in-work disposable income, see e.g. Immervoll and O’Donoghue (2004). 
High replacement rates also reflect low financial incentives to become (or remain) employed. 
Compared to METRs and PTRs, negative values are even more exceptional (though not ruled 
out altogether). RRs are often calculated separately for short-term and long-term unemployed 
to reflect differences in the level of unemployment benefits depending on unemployment 
duration. As work incentive indicators, PTRs and RRs are calculated for non-working 
persons for whom potential employment income is not observed and, hence, the latter must 
be either predicted or assumed.7  
                                                 
7
 For example, OECD calculates these indicators assuming various income levels in the range of 33-150% of 
average (gross) production worker (APW) salary, see e.g. Carone et al. (2004). 
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Although PTRs and RRs both describe work incentives on the extensive margin they have a 
different focus and characteristics (Adam et al., 2006a). For instance, if taxes and benefits are 
changed so that net income increases by the same amount for the out-of-work and in-work 
situation (e.g. corresponding to a lump-sum transfer), then the replacement rate would 
increase while the participation rate would remain unchanged. This is because the tax burden 
on additional income does not change while, in relative terms, working becomes less 
attractive. On the other hand, RRs remain constant if out-of-work and in-work net income 
increase by the same proportion (but for PTRs this is not the case).  
While these three indicators are used to measure work incentives for a particular individual 
by changing individual gross earnings (and labour market status), the effect on disposable 
income is assessed at the household level as this is usually considered to be the more relevant 
unit of assessment for benefits and unit of aggregation when measuring living standards.8 
Each measure can be also decomposed to show the effect of specific tax-benefit instruments, 
for example, income taxes, social insurance contributions and benefits. 
2.2.2. Indicators of automatic adjustments 
Another closely related group of indicators characterise how tax-benefit systems act as 
automatic stabilizers to income or unemployment shocks, i.e. the extent to which (aggregate) 
household income or tax revenue fluctuations are moderated without direct government 
action. These focus on exogenous shocks rather than individual incentives to alter labour 
supply. Apart from this, calculations are technically very similar to the previous group, with 
the main differences to do with the interpretation.9  
                                                 
8
 In principle other units of aggregation within the household could be specified. 
9
 One technical nuance concerns the treatment of multi-person households. While work incentives are typically 
estimated for each household member separately, holding earnings of other household members constant, in the 
case of automatic stabilizers changes are simulated for all of the relevant population at once. 
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Such estimates based on micro-data go back at least to Pechman (1973) who simulated 
income tax revenues in the US for 1954-1971 and showed how much tax liabilities change 
compared to changes in income (at the aggregate level), characterised as built-in flexibility. 
While this is very similar to marginal effective tax rates, the interpretation is different and 
focussed on the macro-level and government revenue side rather than at the individual. A 
closely related measure captures the elasticity of tax liability with respect to changes in 
incomes, i.e. percentage increase in taxes for a one percent change in income, though as 
Auerbach and Feenberg (2000) point out, this mainly reflects the progressivity of taxes as it 
does not capture whether the tax burden is high or low. 
More recently, Auerbach and Feenberg (2000) estimate the aggregate change in taxes when 
increasing all (taxable) income (and deductions) for each individual by 1% to measure the 
responsiveness of tax revenues to income changes for the US. They find that over the period 
1962-1995 income taxes offset between 18% and 28% of variation in before-tax income (at 
the aggregate level). Similarly, Mabbett and Schelke (2007) simulate a 10% increase in 
individual earnings for 14 EU countries and estimate both the responsiveness (i.e. elasticity) 
of various tax-benefit instruments and the overall stabilization effect of the system. The latter 
varies according to their estimates from 31% in Spain to 57% in Denmark. 
Dolls et al. (2012) model a negative income shock where household gross incomes fall by 5% 
and an unemployment shock (with household income at the aggregate level decreasing also 
by 5%), covering both the US and a large number of the EU countries. While the proportional 
income shock is distribution-neutral, the unemployment shock is asymmetric as not all 
households are affected. They find that tax-benefit systems absorb a greater proportion of 
income variation in the EU compared to the US – respectively, 38% vs. 32% of the income 
shock and 47% and 34% of the unemployment shock (see Figure 2), largely explained by the 
higher coverage and generosity of unemployment benefits in Europe. Automatic stabilisers in 
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the case of an unemployment shock are basically replacement rates for a transition from 
employment to non-work at the aggregate level. Rather than work incentives (as discussed in 
the previous section), they reflect how much the tax-benefit system absorbs (market) income 
losses due to becoming unemployed or exiting the labour market altogether.  
Figure 2. Share of income compensated by the tax benefit system in case of an 
unemployment shock  
 
Notes: The unemployment shock corresponds to an increase in the unemployment rate such that the total 
household income decreases by 5%. Countries are ranked by the share of income compensated. EU and EURO 
are population-weighted average of 19 EU and 13 Eurozone countries, respectively, included here. Estonia 
joined the Euro-area later and is here excluded from that group. Source: Dolls et al. (2012) using EUROMOD 
and TAXSIM. 
Instead of focussing on aggregate stabilization, Fernández Salgado et al. (2014) analyse the 
distribution of replacement rates when simulating the unemployment shock in six EU 
countries due to the Great Recession. They distinguish between short- and long-term 
unemployment and their findings confirm higher replacement rates in the short term and 
point to serious challenges for minimum income schemes to cope with the consequences of 
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this crisis in the longer term. They also highlight the important role of incomes of other 
household members in boosting replacement rates. 
2.2.3.  Indicators of household composition effects 
Another type of indicator based on microsimulation captures the effect of changes in 
household socio-demographic characteristics in order to identify the marginal effect of the 
tax-benefit system due to particular household configurations. For example, Figari et al. 
(2011b) apply this approach to calculate “child contingent” incomes estimated as the change 
in household disposable income for families with children as if they did not have children. 
They argue that ‘child-contingent’ incomes, capturing not only transfers net of taxes but also 
tax concessions, account more precisely for the full, net support provided through tax-benefit 
systems to families with children, compared to considering simply (gross) benefit payments 
labelled explicitly for children or families, as is typically the case using the information 
available directly in the survey data. As shown in Figure 3 the net value can be greater than 
the gross if there are tax concessions or child supplements in benefits labelled for other 
purposes, and the gross value can be greater than net if the benefits are taxed or reduced 
because of other interactions. 
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Figure 3. Total net child-contingent payments vs gross family/parental benefits per 
child as a percentage of per capita disposable income  
 
Notes: Countries are ranked by total net child-contingent payments. Source: Figari et al. (2011b) using 
EUROMOD. 
3. The effects of policy changes on the income distribution  
3.1. A basic example 
The simplest use of a tax-benefit microsimulation model involves calculating the effects of a 
policy change on household income, without changing any of the characteristics of the 
household members. A simple example might be an increase in the amount of an existing 
universal child benefit. The model would take account of the increase in payment per eligible 
child, any clawback through the system of means-tested benefits (if the child benefit is 
included in the income assessment for these benefits), any clawback if the benefit is taxed or 
included in the base for contributions and any other relevant interaction with the rest of the 
tax-benefit system. Even a simple reform involves quite complicated arithmetic and ignoring 
the interactions would give misleading results. This is illustrated in Appendix A with a 
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concrete example, comparing the effects of doubling the UK child benefit at two points in 
time: 2001 and 2013. While the structure of child benefit itself has remained the same, the net 
effect of changes to it is quite different because of changes to the interactions with the rest of 
the tax-benefit system. The interactions matter and need to be accounted for in understanding 
the effects of policy changes and in designing policy reforms. 
The financing of such a reform would also need to be considered. For example, if the net cost 
were met by a percentage point increase in all rates of income tax, this increase might also 
have knock-on effects (e.g. if the assessment of any means-tested benefits depended on after 
tax income) and then iterations of the model would be needed to find a revenue-neutral 
solution to the tax rate increase. The “revenue neutral” package could then be evaluated 
relative to the pre-reform situation, in terms of its effect on the income distribution and an 
analysis of gainers and losers.  
Of course, in the new situation some people affected will wish to change their behaviour in 
response to the change, in some way and at some point in time. One might expect labour 
supply and fertility to be affected and, depending on the specifics of the system and the 
change in it, so might other dimensions of behaviour. As Bourguignon and Spadaro (2006) 
point out, it is important to be clear about when these second order effects can, and cannot, be 
neglected. We return to this issue in section 3.3 below.  
In any case, it is clear that an “overnight” or “morning after” analysis, as the pure arithmetic 
effect is often called, is of value in its own right as the immediate effect might be relevant to 
a particular research question. Moreover, the mechanics of the way in which policy reforms 
impact on incomes are relevant for improving design and it will often be important to identify 
how much of the overall effect on income can be attributed to the direct effect.  
29 
 
3.2. Formal framework 
3.2.1. Decomposing static policy effects  
Tax-benefit models provide information on the distribution of household disposable income 
and its components under various policy scenarios, allowing the effects of policies to be 
inferred from a comparison of different scenarios. As such, the application of the 
microsimulation method starts from defining an appropriate baseline and a counterfactual 
scenario. The latter corresponds to the state after policy changes (i.e. how the world would 
look after implementing new policies) in forward-looking analysis or the state before policy 
changes (i.e. how the world would have looked without new policies or what would happen if 
policy changes where rolled back) in the case of backward-looking analysis.  
Drawing on Bargain and Callan (2010) and Bargain (2012a), we provide a formal framework 
for decomposing changes in household income to separate the effects of policy changes.10 
Mathematical formulation helps to avoid ambiguities about how exactly a counterfactual 
scenario is defined, which often arise in empirical microsimulation applications relying only 
on textual descriptions. Furthermore, full decomposition (rather than focusing only on the 
role of policy changes) has clear advantages by drawing attention to the fact that the 
(marginal) contribution of a given component is evaluated conditional on the values of other 
components and, hence, the overall change in income can be decomposed in multiple ways. 
Decomposing all components (at once) also helps to ensure that these are consistently 
derived. Apart from small technical modifications,11 we follow closely Bargain and Callan’s 
original approach but broaden its scope by showing that a wider range of applications can be 
interpreted within the same framework.  
                                                 
10
 There is a notable strand in the economic literature focusing on the decomposition of income distributions, 
reviewed recently in Fortin et al. (2011). This, however, is primarily concerned with wage distributions, 
ignoring the role of tax-benefit policies. 
11
 We carry out decomposition in steps starting from the policy effects – our key interest - and other effects, then 
introducing further splits. Such nesting helps to ensure consistency between the various components and across 
different combinations. We also distinguish socio-demographic characteristics (c) from original incomes (x). 
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Let us denote household socio-demographic (and labour market) characteristics with (a 
vector)   and household original income 12  (i.e. income before adding cash benefits and 
deducting direct taxes) with . The net transfer via the tax-benefit system 	 (i.e. total cash 
benefit entitlement less total direct tax liability) for a household with characteristics  and 
income  is denoted as a function 
, ,, where, following Bargain and Callan (2010), 
we distinguish between the structure of the tax-benefit system 
  and various monetary 
parameters   it takes as arguments (e.g. tax brackets, benefit amounts). 
, ,	 is 
positive if public pensions and cash benefits received by a given household exceed direct 
taxes for which the household is liable, and negative if the opposite holds. Household 
disposable income  is then 
 , , =  + 
, , (1)  
In the simplest case, where original income and household characteristics (can be assumed to) 
remain constant, the effect of policy changes ( →  on disposable income is  
 ∆ = , , − , , (2)  
This corresponds to how the effects of proposed or hypothetical tax-benefit reforms are 
studied typically, i.e. ‘morning-after’ changes, with the policy rules before and after referring 
(implicitly) to the same time period. There are numerous examples of such exercises, e.g. 
Callan and Sutherland (1997), Matsaganis et al. (2006), Matsaganis and Flevotomou (2008), 
Paulus and Peichl (2009), Figari (2010). 
Next, let us consider the case of analysing the effect of policy changes over time. Accounting 
explicitly for the time span over which policy changes are considered introduces additional 
complexities for defining an alternative scenario. It is important to ensure that the baseline 
and the counterfactual refer to the same time period and if there is a time gap between the 
                                                 
12
 This includes market incomes from employment, self-employment, property and investments and other non-
public income sources such as private pensions and transfers between households. It is also known as “pre-tax 
and pre-transfer income” in the literature. 
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existing policies and the counterfactual then one or the other must be adjusted to reflect that. 
For example, when analysing the effect of policy change in  + 1 it may not be sufficient to 
assume that the alternative would have been simply period  policies continuing (in nominal 
terms) in period  + 1, even though this is often implicitly done. One should consider how 
existing policies in nominal terms would have evolved otherwise, given the legal rules or 
usual practice of indexation of policy parameters, or should have evolved. The importance of 
the time factor becomes even more obvious when considering policy changes over a longer 
period. We will return later to the question of what is an appropriate basis for indexing 
monetary parameters in the counterfactual scenario, while for now we simply denote such a 
factor as .  
First, the total change in disposable income for a given household can be decomposed to 
show first order policy effects (or mechanical effects) conditional on household 
characteristics and original incomes in the end-period B (denoting the start-period with A): 
 Δ = , ,  − , , 	 (total change)
= ,  ,  − , ,   (policy effect)
+ , ,  − , ,  (other effect)
= ∆!" +∆!#
 (3) 
Here we are implicitly assuming that we are dealing with panel data, where characteristics 
and original income for the same household are observed in several periods. The total change 
for the same household cannot be observed with multiple waves of cross-sectional datasets, 
however, as explained further below, the same decomposition approach can be also applied at 
the group-level (e.g. the bottom decile group) or to statistics summarising the whole income 
distribution (such as various inequality indices). Importantly, household characteristics are 
only required at a single point in time to calculate the policy effect (in absolute terms).  
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Noting the symmetry of the decomposition, the other effect can be decomposed further into 
two sub-components separating the impact of change in household characteristics and 
nominal levels. The effect due to changes in characteristics can be measured either in end-
period income levels: 
 ∆!# = , ,  − , ,  (change in characteristics)
+ , ,  − , ,  (change in nominal levels) (4) 
or start-period incomes 
 ∆!# = , ,  − , $%,  (change in nominal levels)
+ , $%,  − , ,  (change in characteristics) (5) 
The term capturing the effect of ‘change in nominal levels’ measures how household 
disposable income is affected if original income and all money-metric policy parameters 
change in the same proportion. As Bargain and Callan (2010) pointed out, tax-benefit 
systems are typically homogenous of degree one, meaning that in such a case household 
disposable income would also change by the same factor:  
 , ,  = , ,  (6)  
They illustrate this with a hypothetical example involving a basic income and a flat tax and 
find empirical support for Ireland and France.13 
In principle, the term reflecting the impact of changes in characteristics could be split further 
distinguishing between changes in socio-demographic (and labour market) characteristics c 
and movements in original incomes x. Again, there would be two possible combinations 
which can be obtained by introducing a new term, e.g. either , ,   or 
, ,  with equation 4. 
                                                 
13
 Bargain and Callan (2010) refer to the personal income tax in Germany as one of the few examples for which 
this property does not hold, due to its unique quadratic functional form. 
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Secondly, the change in disposable income can be decomposed to assess policy effects 
conditional on household characteristics and original incomes in the start-period A: 
 Δ = , ,  − , , $%  (other effect)
+ , , $% − , ,  (policy effect)
= ∆!!# +∆!!"
 
(7) 
The other effect can be now decomposed again such that the effects due to changes in 
characteristics are measured in end-period incomes: 
 ∆!!# = , ,  − , ,  (change in characteristics)
+ , ,  − , , $% (change in nominal levels) (8) 
or start-period incomes 
 ∆!!# = , ,  − , $%, $% (change in nominal levels)
+ , $%, $% − , , $% (change in characteristics) (9) 
Altogether there are four ways to decompose the overall change in income, given the initial 
split into the (direct) policy effect and the other effect.   
Until now, we have focused on a single household though it is straightforward to derive the 
aggregate change in disposable income by summing income differences (and its 
subcomponents) across all households:  
 Δ& =' Δ(
(
 (10) 
Decomposition can be also applied to any distributional statistic )	calculated for a specific 
sub-group, e.g. average income among households with elderly, or summarising the whole 
income distribution, * , e.g. the Gini coefficient or the head-count poverty ratio. For 
example, equation 3 would then become (indicating vectors in bold): 
 ΔD, = )[./, 0/, 	1/] − )[.3, 03, 	13] (total change)
= )[./, 0/,1/] − )[./, 0/, 413]  (policy effect)
+ )[./, 0/, 413] − )[.3, 03,13] (other effect)
 
(11) 
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In the case of scale-invariant distributional measures (see Cowell, 2000) and linearly 
homogenous tax-benefit systems, the decomposition of other effects (equations 4-5, 8-9) 
simplifies because the effect of a change in nominal levels becomes (approximately) zero at 
the population level.14 Furthermore, equation 4 is now equivalent to 5 and equation 8 is 
equivalent to equation 9, reducing the overall number of combinations from four to two. 
We now return to what would be an appropriate basis for choosing the indexation factor . 
Bargain and Callan (2010) have argued for using the growth of average original incomes, i.e. 
 = ̅/̅, to obtain a ‘distributionally neutral’ benchmark. This would broadly ensure that 
aggregate disposable income rises (or falls) in proportion to an increase (or a decrease) in 
aggregate original incomes, i.e. the overall tax burden and expenditure level remain constant 
in relative terms.15 Nevertheless, disposable income for a given household could still grow at 
a higher (or lower) rate than their original income if the latter grows less (or more) than on 
average. However, there are alternatives ways of choosing p, depending on the chosen 
conception of “neutrality”. For example basing it on a consumer price index would be 
appropriate if the point was to ensure a constant absolute standard of living (on average). 
Clarke and Leicester (2004) contrast price-indexation with indexation based on the nominal 
GDP, and show that the choice matters for results. There is no clear consensus in the 
literature on decomposition regarding the most appropriate choice of index. 
Finally, there is the issue of how to deal with path dependency and multiple combinations for 
decomposition. Can some combinations be preferred over others or different combinations 
somehow be brought together? In some cases, one might be limited to specific combinations 
by data constraints. The prime example here is ex ante analysis of (implemented) policy 
                                                 
14
 Notice also that with each sub-component aggregated separately (rather than aggregating the differences 
between various components), it is possible to carry out such exercise on two waves of cross-sectional data 
without necessarily using panel data.  
15
 This holds for linearly homogenous tax-benefit systems, while non-linear elements make this an 
approximation. Nevertheless, as demonstrated in Callan et al. (2007) for Ireland, the bias would typically be 
small.  
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changes before micro-data of actual post-reform incomes become available (e.g. Avram et al., 
2013). Relying on estimates for p, one could already quantify the effect of policy changes 
(with equation 7), while both start- and end-year dataset are needed to assess other effects. As 
there are no clear arguments for preferring one particular combination over another, all 
variants should be covered. Bargain and Callan (2010) adopt the Shorrocks-Shapley approach 
(Shorrocks, 2013) to summarise various combinations, essentially averaging the effect of a 
given component across all combinations. In this way, results conditional on household 
characteristics in each period are given equal weights. 
Other examples where such decomposition has been used explicitly include Bargain (2012b), 
Bargain et al. (2013b) and Creedy and Herault (2011). In addition, there is a large literature 
which has carried out similar assessments within less formal frameworks (for example, see 
Clark and Leicester, 2004; Thoresen 2004).  
3.2.2. Specific applications 
Actual vs. counterfactual indexation of policy parameters 
Any system which is not fully indexed with respect to growth in (average) private incomes or 
prices would result in the erosion of the relative value of benefit payments and increased tax 
burden through so-called bracket creep (or fiscal drag). Furthermore, it is essential to 
acknowledge that keeping a tax-benefit system unchanged also impacts household incomes 
(unless the distribution of household original income is also constant over time). Let us 
consider the change in household disposable income in such a case using our notation from 
above:  
 Δ = , ,  − , ,  (12) 
Following the decomposition framework in the more general case above, equation 12 can be 
split again into three terms: the policy effect, changes in original incomes and the change in 
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nominal levels (i.e. change in disposable income if both original incomes and policy 
parameters were scaled up by the same factor). The policy effect would now reflect the 
outcome of keeping policy parameters constant in nominal terms and can be calculated as 
, ,  − , ,  or , , $% − , , . In a typical case, p is positive, 
reflecting growth in private incomes (or consumer prices), and, hence, the policy effect would 
be negative (i.e. income reducing). This is because a positive p implies higher benefit 
amounts and tax bands in the counterfactual scenario and translates into higher disposable 
incomes (for the same original incomes) compared to disposable incomes under tax-benefit 
rules when these are kept nominally constant. This has been studied for example by 
Immervoll (2005), Immervoll et al. (2006) and Sutherland et al. (2008). It is also important to 
realise that if p is negative, i.e. average original incomes (or prices) fall, and a tax-benefit 
systems is kept nominally constant then households’ tax burdens fall in relative terms. 
Policy swaps 
An analogous type of exercise to that comparing the effects of policies across time in one 
country involves assessing the effects of policies from one country (A) when simulated in 
another (B), the so-called policy swaps. The starting point is again equation 3 with the aim 
being instead of comparing the effects of two different national policy regimes on the same 
population and distribution of original incomes, comparing the effects of a particular set of 
‘borrowed’ policies, on different populations and income distributions. Some studies focus on 
the effects of several alternative systems in one particular country (one-way swaps), others 
carry out two-way swaps sometimes involving more than two countries in a series of swaps. 
Section 3.6 discusses some examples of such studies. Instead of growth in income over time 
and the relative movement in tax-and benefit parameters, the nature of p has to do with 
difference in nominal levels of original income across countries. Often there are additional 
complexities involved in maintaining correspondence with original policies, especially if 
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more than one pair-wise comparison is made. Attempts so far have aimed to keep the values 
of parameters fixed in relative terms, for example, in connection to average income or in 
order to maintain budget neutrality.  
Microsimulation-based indicators 
The same framework can be used to describe microsimulation-based indicators, designed to 
capture some inherent characteristics of a given tax-benefit system, which are not directly 
observable. The nature of these was already explained in section 2.2, while here we formalise 
the key definitions. Overall, these indicators show how household disposable income reacts 
to changes in people’s gross earnings and circumstances (for a given tax-benefit system): 
 ∆ = , ,  − , ,  (13) 
Using our notation, we can express marginal effective tax rates (METR) as follows:  
  = 1 − [,  + 7, − , ,]/7 (14) 
where the change in household disposable income is divided by the margin (d) used to 
increment gross earnings () of a given household member, yielding a relative measure. This 
is further deducted from one to show the part of additional earnings which is taxed away. 
In the case of participation tax rates (PTR), both earnings (  ) and other household 
characteristics ( ) are adjusted to reflect the change in labour market status, i.e. from 
inactivity or unemployment (A) to work (B):  
 8 = 1 − [, ,  − , , ]/ −  (15) 
The relative income change is again deducted from one to reflect the effective tax rate at this 
margin. (Note that this could be further simplified as  = 0.) Replacement rates (RR) are 
calculated simply as the ratio of out-of-work disposable income (A) to in-work disposable 
income (B): 
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  = , , /, ,  (16) 
Finally, indicators based on counterfactuals reflecting only changes in household socio-
demographic characteristics (c) can be calculated as Δ = , , − , ,  . For 
example, ‘child contingent’ incomes would show the change in household disposable income 
for families with children (A) compared to if they did not have children (B). 
3.2.3. Decomposition with labour supply changes 
So far we have focused on the static effects of policy changes, whereby potential behavioural 
reactions have been absorbed by the component capturing changes in household 
characteristics more generally. Following Bargain (2012a) we now extend the previous case 
and explicitly account for behavioural changes in the form of labour supply adjustments due 
to policy changes. For this purpose, we slightly change the notation from  to ; , which 
refers to original incomes by population with characteristics   based on labour supply 
choices made under the policy system l. (As such, the meaning of  is exactly the same as 
  before and, hence, will be shortened to the latter.) This allows the term ‘changes in 
characteristics’ to be split into further two components – labour supply adjustments following 
changes in policy rules ( →  and other effects due to changes in the population structure c 
(which are assumed to be exogenous to tax-benefit policy changes, at least in the short and 
the medium term). We can now express the overall change in household disposable income 
as a sum of four components: direct (or mechanical) policy effect, labour supply reactions, 
change in nominal levels and change in characteristics.  
Decomposing equation 4 and combining it with equation 3, we can separate the behavioural 
effects comparing disposable income with labour supply under the initial and the new policy 
rules, expressed in terms of initial policy rules (, ) and either start-period household 
characteristics :  
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 Δy = , ,  − ,  ,  (direct policy effect)
+ ,  ,  − ,  ,  (change in characteristics)
+ ,  ,  − , ,  (behavioural effects)
+ , ,  − , ,  (change in nominal levels)
 
(17) 
or end-period household characteristics  
 Δy = , ,  − ,  ,  (direct policy effect)
+ , ,  − , ,  (behavioural effects)
+ , ,  − , ,  (change in characteristics)
+ , ,  − , ,  (change in nominal levels)
 
(18) 
Decomposing equation 8 instead and combining it with equation 7, allows the behavioural 
effects to be expressed in terms of new policy rules (,  ) and, again, start-period 
household characteristics :  
 
Δy = , ,  − ,  ,  (change in characteristics)
+ , ,  − , ,  (behavioural effects)
+ , ,  − , , $% (change in nominal levels)
+ , , $% − , ,  (direct policy effect)
 
(19) 
 or end-period household characteristics :16 
 Δy = , ,  − , ,  (behavioural effects)
+ , ,  − , ,  (change in characteristics)
+ , ,  − , , $% (change in nominal levels)
+ , , $% − , ,  (direct policy effect)
 
(20) 
Modelling behaviour and in particular labour supply is discussed in more detail in the next 
section.  
3.3. Modelling behavioural changes 
3.3.1. Accounting for individual reactions  
The impact of policies on individual behaviour, through incentives and constraints, is at the 
core of economics and behavioural microsimulation models are valuable tools to provide 
                                                 
16
 We skip decompositions based on equation 5 and equation 9 as the terms for ‘behavioural effects’ and 
‘change in characteristics’ are simply scaled down by p (if the homogeneity property holds), compared to 
equation 4 and 8, respectively. 
40 
 
insights into the potential behavioural reactions to changes in the tax-benefit system and, 
consequently, on their effect on economic efficiency, income distribution and individual 
welfare (Creedy and Duncan, 2002). Nevertheless, it is important to be clear when the second 
order effects can, and cannot, be neglected. To capture the individual welfare effect of 
reforms, it is not always necessary to quantify behavioural responses, on the assumption that 
the effects of the policy changes are marginal to the budget constraint (Bourguignon and 
Spadaro, 2006).  
Of course it is not possible to judge a priori whether the behavioural response is large or 
ignorable. Judgements must necessarily be made on an ad hoc basis, using available evidence 
and related to the context of the analysis and how results are to be interpreted. If behaviour is 
known to be constrained (e.g. in the case of labour supply adjustments at times of high 
unemployment) then behavioural responses might be ignored and the results of the analysis 
treated purely as changes in income (rather than welfare). If static indicators of work 
incentives such as marginal effective tax rates and participation tax rates change very little as 
a result of a policy change then one can assume that labour supply responses driven by 
substitution effects will be small. If the change in income with and without modelled 
behavioural response is expected to be rather similar, then given the error in the modelling of 
behaviour and in the static microsimulation estimates themselves, going to the trouble of 
modelling responses may not be worthwhile (Pudney and Sutherland, 1996).  
Moreover, being clear about the relevant time period is important. From a policy-making 
viewpoint it is the effect on the income distribution and on the public budget in the year of 
the reform that often matters. Most tax and benefit policy changes are made year to year and 
are fine-tuned the following year if necessary. On the one hand, behaviour takes time to adapt 
to changing policies, partly because of constraints, adjustment costs and lack of information 
or understanding. This applies most obviously to fertility but also to labour supply in systems 
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where full information about the policy rules is not available until the end of the year (after 
labour supply decisions have already been acted on). On the other hand, changes in behaviour 
may also happen in anticipation of the policy being implemented, with short-term responses 
larger than long-terms effects. This may apply particularly to tax planning behaviour and is 
well-illustrated by the case of an announcement in the UK in 2009 of a large increase in the 
top rate of tax on high incomes in 2010/11. Major forestalling of income by those who would 
pay the additional tax and were in a position to manipulate the timing of their income resulted 
in an unexpected increase in tax revenue in 2009/10 and a corresponding reduction in the 
following year (HMRC, 2012).  
In some situations the “morning after” effect is the most relevant when considering short-
term policy adjustments and equilibrium (or partial equilibrium) considerations are not 
particularly relevant. Furthermore, if indicative results are needed quickly because reform is 
imperative, then in the absence of an already-estimated and tested behavioural model, static 
results with the appropriate “health warnings” are still more informative than nothing at all. 
Nevertheless, it is widely recognised that, depending on the policy change being analysed, 
ignoring behavioural reactions can lead to misleading estimates of the impact of the policy 
reform on the income distribution and the macro-economic consequences (Bourguignon and 
Spadaro, 2006), as is also illustrated by the tax planning example.  
At the other extreme, modelling behavioural responses in the case of very large changes to 
policy poses challenges for the empirical basis of behavioural modelling. For example, 
replacing an existing tax-benefit system with a combination of a basic income and a flat tax 
such that no income fell below the poverty threshold would presumably result in large 
changes in many dimensions of behaviour which are unlikely to be correctly captured by the 
labour supply models that are used traditionally.  
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Despite the long tradition in modelling behaviour in economics, the behavioural reactions to 
changes in the tax system that are most commonly analysed are related to labour supply 
(starting from the seminal contributions of Aaberge et al. 1995 and van Soest 1995) and 
programme participation (Keane and Moffitt, 1998), feeding into a growing literature, which 
is characterised by an increasing level of econometric sophistication. The same level of 
development does not yet apply to other research areas where microsimulation models have 
been used, e.g. to investigate the potential effects of tax policies on consumption (Creedy, 
1999b; Decoster et al., 2010), saving (Feldstein and Feenberg, 1983; Boadway and Wildasin, 
1995) and housing (King, 1983), at least partly due to a lack of suitable data. 
3.3.2. Labour supply models  
There is a general consensus in the literature about using (static) discrete choice models to 
simulate the individual labour supply reactions to changes in the tax-benefit system.17 Such 
models are structural because they provide direct estimations of preferences over income and 
hours of work, through the specification of the functional form of the utility function. 
Discrete choice models belong to the family of random utility maximisation models 
(McFadden, 1974) which allow the utility function to have a random component (usually 
following the extreme value distribution), affecting the optimal alternative in terms of utility 
level associated with each choice.  
The discrete choice character of the models is due to the assumption that utility-maximising 
individuals and couples choose from a relatively small number of working hour combinations 
which form the personal choice set. Each point in the choice set corresponds to a certain 
disposable income given the gross earnings of each individual (derived using the observed or 
predicted wage), other incomes and the tax-benefit system rules simulated by means of a tax-
benefit microsimulation model taking into account the socio-demographic characteristics of 
                                                 
17
 See Creedy and Kalb (2005) for an extensive review of modelling strategies. 
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the family. The nonlinear and nonconvex budget sets determined by complex tax-benefit 
systems provide a primary source of identification of the model itself. Most of the discrete 
choice models based on the van Soest (1995) approach assume that the same choice sets are 
defined and available for each individual and that an individual has the same gross hourly 
wage for each such alternative. Ilmakunnas and Pudney (1990) is one of the few exceptions 
in the literature, allowing the hourly wage to be different according to the number of hours 
offered by each individual. A more flexible specification is provided by Aaberge et al. (1995) 
that defines the alternatives faced by the individuals in terms of a set of a wage rate, hours of 
work and other job related characteristics. The wage rate can differ for the same individual 
across alternatives, the hours of work are sampled from the observed distribution and the 
availability of jobs of different types can depend on individual and institutional 
characteristics.  
Regardless of the econometric specification, the sample is usually restricted to individuals 
who are considered “labour supply flexible” in order to exclude individuals whose labour 
choices are affected by factors that are not or cannot be controlled for in the labour supply 
model. Examples of these factors include disability status, educational choices or early 
retirement but also self-employment status. This represents a limit in the use of the estimated 
labour supply responses to analyse changes in the overall income distribution because, for the 
individuals not covered by the labour supply models, the behaviour is assumed to be inelastic. 
In most applications, working age individuals within the family are allowed to vary their 
labour supply independently of each other while the utility maximisation takes place at the 
family level considering the income of both partners subject to a pooled income constraint, in 
line with the unitary model of household behaviour. Blundell et al. (2007) is an example of 
structural model of labour supply in a collective setting but excluding the effects of taxes. 
44 
 
Figure 4 depicts the main components of a standard labour supply model which uses a static 
tax-benefit algorithm to generate input for the labour supply estimation and to evaluate the 
labour supply reactions to policy reforms.  
Figure 4: Behavioural tax-benefit model and underlying data 
 
 
In the pre-reform scenario (left panel of Figure 4), the labour supply model is estimated on 
the budget set providing a direct estimate of the preferences over income and hours. In the 
post-reform scenario (right panel of Figure 4) a new budget set for each family is derived by 
the tax-benefit model applying the new tax-benefit rules following the simulated reform. 
Assuming that individual random preference heterogeneity as well as observable preferences 
do not vary over time, labour supply estimates from the pre-reform scenario are used to 
predict the labour supply effects and the second round redistributive effects (i.e. when labour 
supply reactions are taken into account) of the simulated policy reforms. Such effects might 
come out of an iterative procedure calibrating the policy parameters to ensure revenue 
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neutrality once the labour supply reactions and their effects on tax revenue and benefit 
expenditure are taken into account.  
Applications of discrete choice behavioural models are too numerous to be surveyed in this 
context. Along with many applications focussed on the potential effects of specific tax-
benefit policies (among others, see Brewer et al. (2009) for a review of analysis of the effects 
of in-work benefits across countries), labour supply models based on microsimulation models 
provide labour supply elasticities that can be used in other tax policy research (e.g. Immervoll 
et al., 2007). Using EUROMOD and TAXSIM, Bargain et al. (2014) provide the first large-
scale international comparison of labour supply elasticities including 17 EU countries and the 
US. The use of a harmonised approach provides results that are more robust to possible 
measurement differences that would otherwise arise from the use of different data, 
microsimulation models and methodological choices. Figure 5 shows the estimated own-
wage elasticities for single individuals and individuals in couples, which suggest substantial 
scope for the potential impact of tax-benefit reforms on labour supply and hence income 
distribution, though the differences across countries are found to be smaller with respect to 
those in previous studies. Bargain et al. (2014) also show the extent to which labour supply 
elasticities vary with income level which has important implications for the analysis of the 
equity-efficiency trade off inherent in tax-benefit reforms. To this aim, labour supply models 
can be used to implement a computational approach to the optimal taxation problem, 
allowing the empirical identification of the optimal income tax rules according to various 
social welfare criteria under the constraint of revenue neutrality (Aaberge and Colombino, 
2013). 
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Figure 5. Europe and US: own-wage elasticities 
 
Source: Bargain et al. (2014) using EUROMOD and TAXSIM. 
The rapid dissemination of labour supply models, no longer restricted to the academic sphere 
and increasingly used to inform the policy debate, has been accompanied by a continuing 
refinement of the econometric specifications. Nevertheless, further improvements are still 
necessary to model the labour market equilibrium that can emerge as a consequence of a 
policy simulation (Colombino, 2013), to take into account demand side constraints (Peichl 
and Siegloch, 2012) and to exploit the longitudinal dimension of micro-data, where this is 
available, in order to avoid labour supply estimates being potentially biased by individual 
unobserved characteristics and to consider the state dependence in the labour supply 
behaviour (Haan, 2010). 
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3.4. Macroeconomic effects  
In a basic application of a static microsimulation model labour market conditions and levels 
of market income are taken from the underlying data without further adjustments. However, 
these conditions may change due to policy, economic and institutional changes and in order 
to assess the social consequences of macroeconomic changes, it is important to consider the 
interactions of the tax-benefit system with new conditions in the labour market and with other 
macroeconomic effects in general. On the one hand, micro-oriented policies can have a 
second round effect due to micro-macro feedbacks: for example, a generous income support 
scheme can have effects on labour market and saving behaviours. On the other hand, macro 
oriented policies or exogenous shocks have a redistributive impact which needs to be 
assessed if the potential implications for the political economy of the reforms is to be 
understood (Bourguignon and Bussolo, 2013).  
As in the case of a policy change, the microsimulation approach can offer insights in two 
ways. First, it can provide, in a timely fashion, an ex-ante assessment of how individuals are 
affected by the macroeconomic changes, either actual or hypothetical. Second, it can be used 
to develop a counterfactual scenario to disentangle ex-post what would have happened 
without a given component of the macroeconomic shock. However, in order to capture the 
consequences of a macroeconomic shock on income distribution, a partial equilibrium setting 
at micro level can be too limited. The need to capture the interactions of the tax-benefit 
system with population heterogeneity observed at micro level and the macro changes in the 
fundamentals of an economy due to policy reforms or exogenous shocks is necessary.18  
In the last decade, the growing literature has explored different ways to link micro and macro 
models (often belonging to the family of Computational General Equilibrium (CGE) models) 
                                                 
18
 This is less relevant in developing countries where the effects of social expenditures are more relevant in 
shaping the income distribution than tax-benefit systems but it cannot be ignored in mature welfare states and in 
emerging countries due to the increasing use of conditional cash transfer programs. 
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yet the construction of a comprehensive, policy-oriented micro-macro economic model still 
faces many challenging issues. While it is nowadays quite common to see disaggregated 
information from micro level data used in a macro model (i.e. using the parameters of 
behavioural models or the effective tax rates simulated by micro-simulation models in CGE 
models), it is rarer to see a fully developed microsimulation model being integrated with a 
macro model. See Bourguignon and Bussolo (2013) for an excellent review of the different 
approaches.  
The simplest and widely implemented way to combine micro and macro models is the top-
down approach. Robilliard et al. (2008) provide an example of combining in a sequential way 
a microsimulation model with a standard multi-sector CGE model, not only focussing on the 
labour markets but also on the expenditure side taking into account the heterogeneity of 
consumption behaviour of individuals. First, the macro model predicts the linkage variables, 
i.e. new vectors of prices, wages and aggregate employment variables which are the 
consequences of a macroeconomic shock or a new policy. Second, the microsimulation 
model generates new individual earnings and employment status variables consistent with the 
aggregates from the macro model and hence simulates a new income distribution. In such a 
top-down approach, the potential macro feedback effects of the new situation faced by the 
individual are not taken into account specifically but only through the representative 
households embedded in the macro model. Since it depends on the aggregation of behaviour 
at the individual level, this approach can only provide the first-round effects of the exogenous 
(policy) change. Bourguignon et al. (2005) extend the top-down approach by including in the 
microsimulation model the behavioural reactions of individuals to the price changes predicted 
by the macro model. 
In contrast, in the bottom-up approach, the individual behavioural changes due to a policy 
reform are simulated at micro level and then aggregated to feed into the macro model as an 
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exogenous variation in order to analyse the overall effect on the economy. Any feedback 
effect from the macro model back into the microeconomic behaviour is ignored in this setting 
(Brown et al., 2009). 
A more complete recursive approach is given by the combination of the two approaches 
through a series of iterations until effectively no further adjustments are observed, in order to 
take into account the feedbacks that would otherwise be ignored and to arrive at a fully 
integrated macro-micro model. In the macro part of such a model the household sector is not 
given by a few representative households but by the micro level sample of households, 
representative of the whole population. Aaberge et al. (2007) is an example of the integration 
between a labour supply microsimulation model and a CGE model in order to assess the 
fiscal sustainability of the ageing population in Norway. Peichl (2009) uses the same 
approach to evaluate a flat tax reform in Germany. 
Considering the efforts needed to develop a fully integrated model, the choice of the 
appropriate approach depends on the research or policy question at hand, and more 
parsimonious models can do the job in many circumstances. Notwithstanding, a fully 
integrated micro-macro model as suggested by Orcutt et al. (1976) would be an incredibly 
powerful tool to build counterfactuals taking into account feedback effects between micro 
and macro level and to disentangle the effect of a given macro change on individual resources 
and hence on the income distribution. 
3.5. Predicting the income distribution  
Using microsimulation to predict the income distribution is an area of work that is fuelled by 
the need of policy-makers to have more up-to-date estimates of poverty and inequality and 
the effects of policy than can be supplied directly from micro-data that are usually 2 to 3 
years out of date.  
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This need is particularly acute if indicators of income distribution are to be taken into account 
in assessments of economic and social conditions alongside aggregate economic indicators, 
which are generally available in a more timely way (Atkinson and Marlier, 2010; Stiglitz, 
2012). Furthermore, the practice of setting targets for the future achievement of social goals 
is becoming more widespread. In relation to poverty and income distribution this applies 
particularly in the European Union through the Europe 2020 target for risk of poverty and 
social exclusion,19 and in the developing world through the UN Millennium Development 
Goal for eradication of hunger and extreme poverty.20 Predictions of the current situation 
(known as “nowcasts”) are valuable indicators to measure the direction and extent of 
movement towards the associated targets, along with predictions for the target date at some 
future point (i.e. forecasts).  
The approaches to predicting the income distribution depend also on the time framework of 
the analysis. Methods for “nowcasting” and forecasting are distinct in the sense that the latter 
must rely on assumptions or other forecasts about the economic and demographic situation as 
well as the evolution of policies, rather than recent indicators, data and known policy 
parameters. However the choice of techniques is common to both and before discussing the 
two time frameworks in turn, the next sub-section considers a key issue: how to model 
changes in labour market status. 
3.5.1. Modelling change in labour market status 
In order to capture the effects of (exogenous) changes in economic status on the income 
distribution, two techniques can be implemented at micro level. One approach is to re-weight 
the data (Merz, 1986; Gomulka, 1992; Creedy, 2004) while another approach is to model 
transitions from one status to another at individual level (Fernández Salgado et al., 2014). 
                                                 
19
 http://ec.europa.eu/europe2020/targets/eu-targets 
20
 http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/  
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Re-weighting is commonly used because it is relatively straightforward to carry out, and to 
test the effects of alternative specifications. For example, to model an increase in 
unemployment rate (Immervoll et al., 2006b), the survey weights of households containing 
unemployed people at the time the survey was collected must be increased and the weights of 
other similar households reduced, in order to keep demographic characteristics and household 
structures constant in other relevant dimensions. Following this approach, Dolls et al. (2012) 
simulate a hypothetical unemployment shock in 19 European countries and the US in order to 
analyze the effectiveness of the tax and transfer systems to act as an automatic stabilizer in an 
economic crisis.  
However, the main disadvantage of the re-weighting approach, especially in the context of a 
rapidly changing labour market, is that it assigns the characteristics of the “old” unemployed 
(in the original data) to the “new” unemployed (corresponding to the current period). To the 
extent that the unemployed in the data were long-term unemployed this will under-estimate 
the number of new unemployed in receipt of unemployment insurance benefits, which are 
time-limited in most countries, and over-estimate the extent to which incomes are lowered by 
unemployment. Furthermore, the unemployment shock may have affected certain industries 
and occupations more than others. 
Another drawback of re-weighting is that it can result in very high weights for some 
observations which can distort the results of simulations affecting dimensions not controlled 
for. In addition, while the implications of alternative formulations for the empirical results are 
straightforward to explore, it is far less straightforward to assess the statistical properties and 
reliability of the weights themselves, given that for any one set of weights satisfying the 
calibration constraints, there are also others (Gomulka, 1992). 
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Moreover, re-weighting does not permit account to be taken of the interactions between 
changes in the individual status and different tax-benefit instruments, for example to analyse 
to what extent the welfare system counterbalances income losses specifically for those who 
became unemployed rather than at the aggregate level. This is possible with the second 
approach which involves explicit modelling of transitions at the individual level, making use 
of external information about the changes occurring in a given dimension. In principle, the 
full range of relevant characteristics of the people affected can be taken into account. An 
explicit simulation allows for the detailed effects of tax and benefit policy to be captured for 
those making the transition. In other words, it gives the possibility to produce quasi 'panel 
data' tracking the same individual before and after a given change, disentangling what would 
have happened without the change and highlighting the interactions of the tax-benefit system 
with the individual socio-demographic characteristics.  
Following this approach, Fernández Salgado et al. (2014) simulate the individual transitions 
from employment to unemployment at the onset of the Great Recession in six European 
countries. As a consequence of the macroeconomic shock, household incomes of individuals 
who lose their job are predicted, considering the direct cushioning effect of the tax-benefit 
systems and the way they depend on the market income of other household members and 
personal/household characteristics. The comparison between incomes before and after the 
shock provides a way to stress-test the tax-benefit systems assessing the relative and absolute 
welfare state resilience.  
To date there have been few systematic comparisons of re-weighting versus the explicit 
simulation of individual transitions. Hérault (2010) provides a comparison of results using the 
two methods on South African data and concludes that “the reweighting approach can 
constitute a good alternative when data or time constraints do not allow the use of the 
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behavioural approach and when the production of individual level transition matrices in and 
out of employment is not essential” (p. 41). 
3.5.2.  Nowcasting 
Tax-benefit microsimulation models have for many years been used to simulate the effects of 
the most recent policies so that ex ante analysis of policy reforms can take the current 
situation as the starting point. In doing this, it is necessary to update the input micro-data to 
reflect current economic and social conditions. This might be done with varying degrees of 
sophistication depending on the question at hand and the amount of change in relevant 
dimensions between the reference period of the micro-data and the reference year of the 
policy. Usually, information in the data on original income is updated using appropriate 
indexes. In addition, the sample might be re-weighted to account for certain demographic and 
economic changes (see section 3.5.1). The simulated distribution of household disposable 
income, based on adjusted population characteristics, updated original income and simulated 
taxes and benefits using current rules, is then assumed to be a reasonable representation of the 
current income distribution.21 
However, in times of rapid change two factors suggest that this approach may not be 
adequate. First, simple re-weighting cannot generally capture major changes accurately and 
income growth may vary greatly around the mean, requiring a disaggregated approach. Most 
obviously this applies in the case of an economic downturn and a sudden increase in 
unemployment with its asymmetric effects, or an upturn and an increase in employment, 
when, as is typically the case, the impact is uneven across the population. Secondly, it is at 
times of rapid change or economic crisis that policy-makers particularly need to know about 
very recent movements in the income distribution and the current situation rather than those a 
few years previously. The same applies in times of growth if policy-makers are concerned 
                                                 
21
 See for example Redmond et al. (1998) and Callan et al. (1999). 
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about some sections of the population being left behind. Furthermore, in times of crisis fiscal 
stimulus or fiscal consolidation policies may play a particularly important role in re-shaping 
the income distribution. A microsimulation approach has particular advantages because it 
captures the specific impact of the components of these policy packages that have a direct 
effect on household incomes, as well as their interactions with changing market incomes. In 
times of rapid growth, fiscal drag will typically have distributional consequences (see section 
3.2.2), which will be important for policy-makers to anticipate if they wish to prevent relative 
poverty from rising (Sutherland et al., 2008). 
Borrowing the term “nowcasting” from macroeconomics (see, for example, Banbura et al., 
2011) the use of an extended and refined set of microsimulation methods in combination with 
timely macro-economic statistics is able to provide estimates of the current income 
distribution using micro-data on household income which are typically 2 or more years out of 
date. These methods include: (a) updating market incomes from the income data year to 
current (or latest), using published indexes with as much disaggregation as these statistics 
allow; and from the latest to “now” according to macro-level forecasts or assumptions; (b) 
simulating policy changes between the income data year to those prevailing currently; (c) 
data adjustments to account for important dimensions of actual labour market change 
between the data year and the most recently available information; (d) data adjustments to 
account for actual and projected demographic and other compositional changes (e.g. 
household composition) between the data year and “now”.22  
An early attempt to use these methods to update poverty statistics for the UK is provided by 
de Vos and Zaidi (1996). More recently, these methods have been used to nowcast the policy 
effects of the crisis in Ireland (Keane et al., 2013); to examine the distributional effects of the 
                                                 
22
 Some studies also make specific data adjustments that are relevant to the effect of policies in the projection 
period, such as increasing the pension age (Brewer et al., 2011). 
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crisis in Greece (Matsaganis and Leventi, 2013) and to nowcast the income distribution in 
Ireland (Nolan et al., 2013), the UK (Brewer et al., 2013) and Italy (Brandolini et al., 2013). 
They have also been used for 8 European Union countries to nowcast risk of poverty using 
EUROMOD (Navicke et al., 2013).23 
A key issue for all the studies that aim to nowcast the income distribution in (or on the way 
out of) the Great Recession, using pre-recession data, is to capture labour market changes 
sufficiently precisely. The same would apply during a period of increasing employment rates. 
Most of the studies cited above use re-weighting to adjust for both demographic and labour 
market changes. The study by Navicke et al. (2013) is an exception and, holding 
demographic factors constant, used explicit simulation of labour market transitions to capture 
the very specific and varied incidence of unemployment across the eight countries considered 
in the relevant period. The method is based on that used by Figari et al. (2011c) using Labour 
Force Survey (LFS) statistics to establish the required number of transitions of each type 
according to personal characteristics. The microsimulation model, in this case EUROMOD, 
then selects from the available pool of people with these characteristics in the input database 
and changes their status accordingly. Incomes are simulated, taking account of the new status, 
for example by calculating eligibility and entitlement to unemployment benefits for those 
making the transition from employment to unemployment.  
3.5.3. Forecasting 
While nowcasts can make use of very recent indicators of economic and labour market 
conditions, and typically project forward by only a few years, allowing slowly-changing 
                                                 
23
 In the US, where there is also an interest in predicting current indicators, child poverty has been nowcast 
using a simple econometric model based on state level current and lagged economic indicators and benefit 
receipt statistics (Isaacs and Healy, 2012). This is a feasible approach, rather than using microsimulation, 
because in the US the poverty threshold is not a function of the income distribution, as it is in the EU, and 
because welfare benefit receipt is in itself a good predictor of poverty, which is not the case in the EU or 
elsewhere in the OECD.   
56 
 
factors such as demographic composition to stay the same, forecasts generally project further 
in time and must rely on assumptions and predictions from other models. In this sense they 
are usually better seen as drawing out the implications for the income distribution of a 
particular economic/demographic scenario. For example, Marx et al. (2012) explore the 
implications of meeting the Europe 2020 targets for employment for indicators of risk of 
poverty and social exclusion, finding that the composition of any new employment is a key 
factor. World Bank (2013) uses a similar approach to exploring the implications of meeting 
both the education and employment targets for the poverty indicators in the countries of 
Eastern Europe. In both cases there is no tax-benefit microsimulation and it is assumed that 
tax-benefit effects are as in the underlying micro-data. This is justified on the grounds that 
future policy reforms are difficult to predict. However, this approach neglects any 
interactions between socio-demographic and labour market characteristics and the tax-benefit 
system. Microsimulation can take account of these and, even assuming a constant tax-benefit 
policy structure and a constant relationship between income levels and tax-benefit 
parameters, would allow the automatic effects of policies on changing market incomes to be 
captured.  
Nevertheless, as explained in section 3.2.2 above, it is important to be aware that assumptions 
about the indexation of current policies can have a major effect on distributional outcomes 
(Sutherland et al., 2008). In some situations enough is known about the probable evolution of 
policies to include in the predictions the discretionary tax-benefit reform effects, as well as 
the automatic effects driven by changes in the circumstances of households. In the UK not 
only are policy reforms often announced several years in advance, but also there is detailed 
information available about indexation assumptions that are built into official public finance 
forecasts (HM Treasury, 2013; Table A1), as well as regular and detailed growth and 
inflation forecasts (OBR, 2013; Table 2.1) that can together be used as baseline assumptions 
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in defining policies in the forecast year. Brewer et al. (2011) have forecast child poverty in 
2020 using a combination of these types of assumptions, re-weighting and tax-benefit 
microsimulation. Such an approach not only provides a prediction (in this case that, given the 
assumptions, the UK will not meet its target for child poverty reduction in 2020) and allows 
the drivers of the prediction to be identified (through sensitivity analysis) but also allows a 
“what would it take?” analysis to suggest what combinations of reforms and other changes 
would be needed to meet the target.  
3.6. Cross country comparisons using microsimulation 
Cross-country comparisons of the effects of policies naturally add value to what can be said 
about a single country because the broader perspective helps to provide a sense of scale and 
proportion. They provide the basis for assessing the robustness of results and to generalise 
conclusions. In addition, considering several countries within the same analysis provides a 
kind of "laboratory" in which to analyse the effects of similar policies in different contexts or 
different policies with common objectives (Sutherland, 2014). Comparisons can take several 
forms. At their simplest the effects of different policies or policy reforms in different 
countries can be analysed side-by side. Bargain and Callan’s (2010) decomposition analysis 
for France and Ireland is one example of this approach. Another is Avram et al. (2013) who 
analyse the distributional effects of fiscal consolidation measures within a given period in 
nine countries.  
A second approach is to contrast the effects of a common, hypothetical policy reform in 
several countries, highlighting the relevance of the interactions of a specific policy design 
with population characteristics and economic conditions. Often the “reform policy” is 
designed to highlight features of the existing national system that it replaces or supplements. 
Examples include Atkinson et al. (2002) and Mantovani et al. (2007) for minimum 
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guaranteed pensions, Levy et al. (2007a) for universal child benefits, Callan and Sutherland 
(1997) for basic income, Bargain and Orsini (2007) and Figari (2010) for in-work benefits, 
Matsaganis and Flevotomou (2008) for universal housing transfers, Figari et al. (2012b) for 
the taxation of imputed rent, and Paulus and Peichl (2009) for flat taxes. This type of analysis 
is usually complicated by the need for the reform policy to be scaled somehow if it is to have 
an equivalent effect in countries with different levels of income, and because of the need to 
consider how the reform policies should be integrated with existing national policies. Given 
that the starting points are different (e.g. the tax systems may treat pensions differently) the 
net effects will differ too.  
A third approach, which was introduced in section 3.2.2 above, is to swap existing policies 
across countries in order to explore how their effects differ across different populations and 
economic circumstances. Examples of this kind of “policy learning” experiment include a 
comparison of the effectiveness of benefits for the unemployed in Belgium and the 
Netherlands (De Lathouwer, 1996) and many studies of the effectiveness of public support 
for children and their families: Atkinson et al. (1988) for France and the UK; Levy et al. 
(2007b) for Austria, Spain and the UK; Levy et al. (2009) for Poland, France, Austria and the 
UK; Salanauskaite and Verbist (2013) for Lithuania, Estonia, Hungary, Slovenia and the 
Czech Republic; and Popova (2014) who compares Russia with four EU countries.  
Policy swap analysis can in principle be done using a set of national microsimulation models, 
side by side. But Callan and Sutherland (1997) found that the task of making models produce 
comparable results was formidable, even for just two (arguably) relatively similar countries 
(Ireland and the UK). This justified the construction of EUROMOD as a multi-country model 
which now covers all EU Member States (see Box 1).  
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Indeed, with some exceptions, many of the studies referred to above make use of 
EUROMOD. As intended, this greatly facilitates cross-country comparability (particularly of 
the concepts used), the implementation of common reforms using common code and the 
mechanics of carrying out policy swaps (transferring coded policies from country A to 
country B). EUROMOD is designed to be as flexible as possible, allowing a huge range of 
assumptions to be made about cross-country equivalence of different aspects of policy 
simulation. One example is the treatment of non take-up of benefits (see section 4.2) another 
is the default indexation of policies each year (see section 3.2.2). Thus policy swapping is not 
a mechanical procedure. Each exercise has its own motivation and corresponding decisions to 
be made about which aspects of policy (and assumptions driving its impact) are to be 
“borrowed” from elsewhere and which to be retained from the existing local situation.  
Here, we give two empirical examples. The first is an example of side-by-side cross-country 
analysis using EUROMOD from Avram et al. (2013). This compares the distributional effects 
of the fiscal consolidation measures taken in nine European countries in the period up to 2012 
from the start of the financial and economic crisis.24 Figure 6 shows the percentage change in 
average household income due to the measures across the (simulated) 2012 income 
distribution. The measures include different mixes of increases in income tax and social 
contributions and cuts in public pensions, other cash benefits and public sector pay.  
                                                 
24
 These matter, not only for their immediate effect on income inequality but also because they may have 
consequences for the political acceptability of the measures (Perotti, 1996) and for the macro-economic 
recovery (Paulus et al., 2013). 
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Figure 6. Percentage change in household disposable income due to fiscal consolidation 
measures 2008-12 by household income decile group 
 
Notes: Deciles are based on equivalised household disposable income in 2012 in the absence of fiscal 
consolidation measures and are constructed using the modified OECD equivalence scale to adjust incomes for 
household size. The lowest income group is labelled “1” and the highest “10”. The charts are drawn to 
different scales, but the interval between gridlines on each of them is the same. Source: Avram et al. (2013) 
using EUROMOD. 
Four things are striking about this figure and serve to demonstrate the added value of cross-
country comparisons of this type, relative to single country studies. First, the scale of the 
effect varies greatly across the countries (noting that the country charts are drawn to different 
scales but the grid interval is uniformly 2 percentage points), ranging from a drop in income 
on average from in 1.6% Italy to 11.6% in Greece. Secondly the choices made by 
governments about which instruments to use differ across countries. Thirdly the incidence of 
the particular changes is not necessarily as one might expect a priori. For example, increases 
-10
-8
-6
-4
-2
0
2
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Household income decile group
Estonia
-10
0
10
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
income tax and workers SIC non-pension benefits public pensions (net) public wages household disposable income
-16
-14
-12
-10
-8
-6
-4
-2
0
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Household income decile group
Greece
-10
-8
-6
-4
-2
0
2
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Household income decile group
Spain
-6
-4
-2
0
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Household income decile group
Italy
-14
-12
-10
-8
-6
-4
-2
0
2
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Household income decile group
Latvia
-6
-4
-2
0
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Household income decile group
Lithuania
-10
-8
-6
-4
-2
0
2
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Household income decile group
Portugal
-10
-8
-6
-4
-2
0
2
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Household income decile group
Romania
-6
-4
-2
0
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Household income decile group
UK
61 
 
in income tax have a roughly proportional effect in many countries and are concentrated on 
higher income households only in Spain and the UK as might be expected a priori. Cuts in 
(contributory parental) benefits in Latvia particularly target the better off. Finally, the overall 
distributional effects range from broadly progressive in Greece, Spain, Latvia and the UK to 
broadly regressive in Estonia.  
The second example is of a policy swap, showing what would happen to child poverty in 
Poland under a range of child and family tax-benefit arrangements compared with the actual 
2005 system including a reform introduced in 2007 and the revenue-neutral alternatives 
offered by scaled down versions of the Austrian, French and UK systems of child and family 
support (Levy et al., 2009). As Figure 7 shows, any of the alternative policy systems would 
have reduced child poverty by more than the actual 2007 reform (costing the same). The 
French and UK systems would perform especially well from this perspective. 
As well as EUROMOD there have been other multi-country initiatives to construct and use 
microsimulation models. These include a Latin American project that built separate models 
using a range of software and approaches for Brazil, Chile, Guatemala, Mexico and Uruguay 
(Urzúa, 2012). A WIDER project has constructed models that are available in simplified form 
on the web for ten African countries.25 To our knowledge neither set of models has been used 
for cross-country comparisons of the effects of common reforms or for policy swap exercises. 
In contrast there is an ongoing collaboration among some of the Balkan countries to make use 
of the EUROMOD platform to build models with the explicit intention that they will be used 
for comparisons. The Serbian model SRMOD is the first completed step in this process 
(Ranđelović and Rakić, 2013) followed by the Macedonian model, MAKMOD (Mojsoska 
Blazevski et al., 2013). Similarly, the South African model SAMOD, again using the 
EUROMOD platform, (Wilkinson, 2009) has been joined by a sister model for Namibia (NA-
                                                 
25
 http://african-models.wider.unu.edu/  
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MOD), with the aim, among other things, of modelling “borrowed” policies that have been 
successful in a South African context (Wright et al., 2014).  
Figure 7. Child poverty in Poland under alternative tax-benefit strategies  
 
Notes: Poverty is measured using FGT indexes and 60% of median household disposable income as the poverty 
threshold. Source: Levy et al. (2009) using EUROMOD. 
 
4. Challenges and limitations  
4.1. Reconciling simulated income with recorded income and macro statistics 
A common problem when using micro-data from surveys for the analysis of policies and 
income distribution is that aggregate values (e.g. of gross earnings or income taxes) do not 
match estimates from National Accounts or other sources of macro-economic statistics. This 
problem also applies to microsimulation studies based on survey data, with one exception. 
Tax-benefit model calculations of benefit entitlements may match administrative totals better 
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than information on recorded receipt in the data, if there is a problem of under-reporting of 
these sources of income in the survey.  
Chapter 12 considers the reconciliation of household surveys and national accounts. Here, we 
focus on a somewhat different issue, also related to the plausibility and usability of empirical 
findings. This is that the simulated income distribution is not identical to the income 
distribution that is measured using the underlying survey (or register) micro-data directly. 
Typically measures of income inequality in microsimulated estimates, using the same micro-
data and the relevant policy year, are lower. Adjustments in the simulations for the non take-
up of benefits and for tax evasion go some way to reducing the discrepancy and these issues 
are discussed in section 4.2. However, they appear not to be the full explanation and it is clear 
that the contributory factors differ across countries. Indeed, in some countries for particular 
datasets and policy years the differences are small: for example, Figari et al. (2012a) show 
this to be the case for four EU countries using data from the EU Statistics on Income and 
Living Conditions (EU-SILC) and EUROMOD. However this is by no means always or often 
the case and reconciling simulated with recorded estimates is an important component of both 
the process of building a tax-benefit model and validating the content of micro-data from 
surveys.  
As alluded to above, there is evidence that some surveys under-report recipients of some 
major cash benefits, when compared with administrative statistics.26 If the reason for this is 
failure to report these sources of income by recipients then simulated benefits may perform 
better, generally leading to higher incomes at the bottom of the distribution and suggesting 
that the survey over-estimates income inequality. An illustration from the UK is provided in 
Box 2.  
                                                 
26
 For the UK see http://statistics.dwp.gov.uk/asd/frs/2008_09/frs_2008_09_report.pdf, Table M.6. The 
increasingly used practice of linking surveys to administrative sources of income data should reduce the 
prevalence of this problem. 
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Box 2: Benefit recipients in the UK: comparing microsimulation estimates 
with survey responses and administrative statistics  
The UK Family Resources Survey (FRS) data which is used as input by all the main UK tax-
benefit models under-estimates recipiency of some benefits by as much as 30% in the case 
of Pension Credit, as shown in the table below.*  Simulations using the UK component of 
EUROMOD based on the same data halve the amount of the discrepancy for Pension Credit. 
The simulations take account of non take-up by applying official estimates for each benefit 
and client group. Simulations are also closer to the administrative data values in the case of 
Housing Benefit (where the shortfall is 2% compared with 19% in the data) but in the case of 
Working Tax Credit the simulated shortfall is larger. The entitlement here mainly depends 
on being in low paid work over the year allowing families to meet the eligibility criteria for 
Working Tax Credit for short periods which is not captured by the simulations based on 
current income and circumstances. For the other two payments shown in the table, 
EUROMOD over- rather than under- estimates recipiency. The over-estimation of Child Tax 
Credit recipients is to some extent explained by the administrative statistics not containing 
some long-term recipients of Income Support, whose child payments are still waiting to be 
migrated to the tax credit system. Most simulated and non-simulated benefits are included 
in the means-test for the Council Tax Benefit: its overestimation is expected to the extent 
that some non-simulated benefits are under-reported and tax credits are under-simulated. 
Clearly, simulating receipt is not a solution in itself and a comprehensive reconciliation 
needs other benefit-specific factors to be taken into account.  
Numbers of recipients of selected UK benefits in 2009/10: estimates from Family 
Resources Survey (FRS), EUROMOD and administrative statistics (thousands) 
  FRS EUROMOD 
Administrative 
statistics 
Ratio 
FRS/external 
Ratio 
EUROMOD/external 
Working Tax 
Credit 
1,800 1,615 2,240 0.80 0.72 
Child Tax 
Credit 
3,700 4,951 4,090 0.90 1.16 
Pension 
Credit 
1,800 2,337 2,580 0.70 0.85 
Housing 
benefit 
3,700 4,474 4,550 0.81 0.98 
Council tax 
benefit 
5,100 6,331 5,570 0.92 1.14 
Source: EUROMOD version F6.20 with adjustments for non-take-up, using Family Resources Survey 2009/10 
updated to 2010/11 incomes. 
* After adjusting the administrative statistics for recipients not living in UK private households in the case of 
Pension Credit. 
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Shortfalls in reported receipt of means-tested welfare benefits compared with administrative 
information are also found in US surveys, on a larger scale (Meyer et al., 2009). Wheaton 
(2007) uses microsimulation to calculate entitlement and then to calibrate the numbers of 
recipients so that they match administrative statistics. The result is a large increase in the 
estimated extent of poverty reduction due to the programs in question.  
However, as illustrated in Box 2, under-reporting of benefit income may not be the only 
source of the problem. If part of the reason for the shortfall in the survey is that benefit 
recipients are more likely to be non-respondents, then microsimulation of eligibility and 
entitlement is unlikely to solve the problem on its own and benefit recipiency estimates will 
still not match administrative information. In this case re-calculation of the survey weights 
including controls for characteristics that are correlated with benefit receipt and also under-
represented in the survey may in principle provide a solution, if such characteristics can be 
identified and external information is available to control the process. This is not often the 
case.  
There are many possible reasons for discrepancies in each simulated income component. 
Here we discuss income tax as an important example. First, survey estimates of income tax 
may not relate to the current year or may include only withholding taxes. Second, survey 
gross incomes (and hence taxes) may have been imputed from net income (see also section 
2.1) but their quality and consistency with calculations in the tax-benefit model is usually 
difficult to establish due to detailed documentation not being made available. We might also 
expect some discrepancies when compared with fiscal data. Such comparisons necessarily 
take national specifics into account, including the nature of the tax structure and 
administration as well as the questions asked in the survey. The nature of the comparison and 
the conclusions that are drawn also depend on whether fiscal data are available at micro-level 
and whether they can be matched to the survey. In addition the fiscal data themselves may 
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not provide a fully reliable benchmark, especially if they are based on samples of 
administrative data or if the administrative process that generates them is not comprehensive 
or consistent. We provide a case study in Appendix B based on a published table of fiscal 
statistics, for the UK.  
Microsimulation estimates of income taxes may be over- or under- estimated relative to what 
is shown by fiscal data. For example, income tax may be under-estimated because the market 
incomes that make up the tax base are under-reported or the survey does not adequately 
represent high income taxpayers. In this case estimates of income distribution are sometimes 
adjusted by inflating incomes at the top of the distribution, informed by fiscal data. This is the 
case for the official estimates of poverty and income distribution produced by the UK 
Department of Work and Pensions (DWP, 2013) though the same adjustment is not (to our 
knowledge) applied in UK tax-benefit models. In contrast, the French model TAXIPP merges 
micro-data and statistics from many sources for its input database. 27  This includes 
information on top incomes specifically to capture correctly the very top of the distribution 
and particularly the taxes paid by that section of the population (Bozio et al., 2012).  
Income tax may be over-estimated because of tax evasion that has not been modelled (see 
section 4.2). It may be over-estimated because it is not possible to model or measure the size 
of some tax reliefs and common avoidance measures. It may also be under- or over-estimated 
in line with other simulated income components which are taxable. Combinations of these 
factors may occur and indeed it is possible for the simulated tax aggregate to match well that 
from fiscal data but for the distribution of tax paid to be very different – see Appendix B for 
an example of this. In addition, estimates of gross income and tax liability from fiscal data 
themselves may be subject to error, due to tax evasion.  
                                                 
27
 http://www.ipp.eu/en/tools/taxipp-micro-simulation/  
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Time periods for income assessments are also important. In surveys that collect current 
income (as in the UK) which is mainly from a reference time period of a month, the 
simulation of income tax must assume that the same monthly income was received all year 
and will not identify cases with tax liability for part of the year. However, the survey 
response for those with part year incomes will, at least in principle, indicate the 
correspondingly lower or higher tax payments, already adjusted for part-year incomes. The 
UK is unusual in collecting short-period current income. Most income surveys ask about 
annual income (in the previous year) which is the appropriate reference time period for the 
calculation of tax liabilities. However, it must also be used to simulate the income assessment 
of social assistance and other means-tested benefits for which the relevant period is generally 
much shorter than one year. This leads to fewer households being simulated to receive these 
benefits than shown in the data.  
Generally, simulations are only as good as the underlying micro-data and, in the cases where 
they are necessary, as good as the imputations and adjustments that must be carried out in the 
absence of all the necessary information. This in turn depends on the specifics of the national 
benefit and tax systems as well as the quality of the data. In some circumstances it might be 
appropriate to calibrate and re-weight to try and adjust the baseline simulated distribution of 
income and its components to match that given by the data directly. Generally, however, such 
an approach will distort the estimates of change due to a policy reform. A better approach is 
to try and understand the source of each problem and to make adjustments that can be applied 
in a consistent way, and with transparent assumptions, across policy scenarios. This 
highlights the importance not only of validation and adjustment but also of documenting the 
process so that users of the models and readers of model applications can make their own 
assessment, based on the research questions at hand.  
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4.2. Modelling non take-up and non-compliance 
One particular challenge arises with benefit non take-up and tax non-compliance. 28 This is 
because there is no natural data source with explicit information about these phenomena and 
modelling each is highly context-specific. Accounting for take-up and non-compliance 
behaviour in tax-benefit models is important as it affects estimates of fiscal aggregates (i.e. 
total benefit expenditures and tax revenues) but even more importantly as it can affect various 
parts of the income distribution in a different way. Furthermore, take-up and compliance 
behaviour are likely to be affected by tax-benefit policy reforms and, hence, are themselves 
endogenous factors in the analysis. Even if microsimulation models commonly assume full 
take-up and compliance this has an important implication for cross-national comparisons as 
results are unlikely to be consistent, as long as the prevalence and patterns of non take-up and 
non-compliance vary across countries. 
Benefit non take-up refers to the situation where those eligible for a given benefit do not 
successfully claim it for various reasons. This could be simply due to people not being aware 
of their entitlement (or even the existence of a particular form of public support), being put 
off by a complex or time-consuming claiming process, or related to social stigma, i.e. not 
wanting to appear vulnerable and dependent on others’ support. In an economic context, 
these factors can be summarised as implied costs related to take-up (Hernandez et al., 2007). 
Another likely key determinant is the size of the entitlement (Blundell et al., 1988), both in 
absolute terms and relative to other income sources and wealth of the claimant. Benefit take-
up tends to be higher for universal benefits as the claiming process is simpler and the 
associated social stigma lower. Arguably, people are most likely to claim contributory 
benefits (e.g. for old age and maternity) as these are directly linked to their own previous 
contributions and, hence, entitlement is perceived to be more justified, while take-up of 
                                                 
28
 Benefit take-up is also referred to as welfare participation, especially in the studies on the US. 
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means-tested benefits tends to be lower. Therefore, assuming full take-up can distort 
comparisons between various benefits and make some benefits seem more effective than in 
fact they are. It also matters how extensive and long-established the benefit scheme is, as this 
contributes to the spread of knowledge among the population. A related phenomenon is 
benefit leakage, meaning that a benefit is received by those who should not be eligible. This 
could either indicate an unintentional error on behalf of the benefit administrator or claimant, 
or benefit fraud.  
Studies estimating the scale and determinants of benefit take-up require information on 
eligibility for a given benefit and actual benefit awards. As benefit eligibility is not directly 
observed (for a wider population) it must be inferred from relevant individual and household 
characteristics on the basis of benefit rules – and as such constitutes a microsimulation 
exercise in itself. Depending on the nature of the rules, especially when income means-testing 
is involved, there can be complex interactions with other tax-benefit instruments as well as 
with tax compliance. It is difficult to over-emphasise the importance of data quality in this 
context, and most precise estimates can presumably be obtained with administrative data 
providing information as close as possible to that used by the welfare agencies, as well as 
actual benefit receipt (e.g. Bargain et al. 2012). For this to cover all potentially eligible 
people and not just claimants, it implies that agencies rely (mainly) on information from 
existing registries (e.g. tax records) rather than data collection from the claimants. Even then 
it can still leave some scope for simulation error if the claiming process involves e.g. 
discretion on behalf of officials awarding benefits. For example, local social welfare offices 
are in some countries given a considerable level of discretion in deciding who is in greater 
need and, hence, more qualified for public support. On the other hand, there could be also 
errors made by the program administrators in the assessment of the eligibility, resulting in an 
incorrect approval or rejection of the claim. 
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This type of administrative data, if it exists, is usually not accessible and most empirical 
studies have relied on survey data instead. There are however additional challenges with 
survey data due to potential measurement error in the observed benefit receipts and relevant 
other characteristics affecting the eligibility and the entitlement calculation – see also section 
4.1. For example, survey respondents may have simply forgotten the receipt of a particular 
benefit, associated it with an incorrect period or benefit type, or intentionally left it 
unreported (e.g. because of social stigma). There is often also a time delay between becoming 
entitled and receiving a first payment. Therefore a careful assessment and cleaning of benefit 
data is usually required (e.g. Hancock and Barker 2005; Matsaganis et al., 2010). Similarly, 
individual and household characteristics relevant for determining benefit eligibility and 
entitlement might be reported with error, especially other income sources and/or assets in the 
case of means-tested benefits. There have been only a few attempts to model the various 
errors explicitly (Duclos, 1995 and 1997; Hernandez and Pudney, 2007; Zantomio et al., 
2010). 
The modelling of benefit take-up becomes even more complicated when considering the 
receipt of multiple benefits (e.g. Dorsett and Heady, 1991; Hancock et al., 2004), interactions 
with labour supply (e.g. Moffitt, 1983; Keane and Moffitt, 1998; Bingley and Walker, 1997 
and 2001) or dynamics in the take-up behaviour (e.g. Blank and Ruggles, 1996; Anderson 
and Meyer, 1997). Analyses combining several of these aspects are rare, e.g. Chan (2013), 
and avoiding behavioural responses in other dimensions, such as labour supply, is one reason 
why many of the recent advances in take-up modelling have concentrated on take-up among 
the retired or others unable to work (e.g. Hernandez and Pudney, 2007; Pudney et al., 2006; 
Zantomio et al., 2010). Much of the applied research that has been done is for the UK and US 
(see above), but, among others, there are also studies for Canada (Whelan, 2010), Finland 
(Bargain et al., 2012), Germany (Riphahn, 2001; Bruckmeier and Wiemers, 2012), Greece 
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and Spain (Matsaganis et al., 2010).29 For recent reviews, see Hernanz et al. (2004) and 
Currie (2004). 
Despite general progress with modelling take-up, it remains a challenge to deal with in 
microsimulation models due to the data requirements and complexities involved. Ideally, tax-
benefit models should treat take-up endogenously in simulations, as policy reforms can 
change take-up behaviour (e.g. Zantomio et al., 2010). Such attempts remain scarce; see e.g. 
Pudney et al. (2006). A second best approach is to predict the probability of take-up 
conditional on personal characteristics which are not affected by policy changes and hence 
remain constant in policy simulations. To predict take-up on the basis of previously estimated 
statistical models the same explanatory variables need to be present in the data used for the 
tax-benefit model. Furthermore, take-up is highly circumstantial and a prediction model 
developed for one benefit in one country is unlikely to perform satisfactorily for other 
benefits or countries. A simpler approach used commonly to account for incomplete benefit 
take-up in tax-benefit models is to assign take-up randomly among the group of eligible units 
for a given benefit such that the aggregate take-up rate matches that in official statistics or 
previous studies (e.g. Redmond et al., 1998; Sutherland et al., 2008; Hancock and Pudney, 
2014). This is obviously a rather crude approach as some people are more likely to claim than 
others and, hence, it may not be sufficient to align aggregate benefit expenditure with official 
statistics, particularly if take-up is correlated with the level of entitlement. Another option is 
to link benefit entitlement to the observed receipt which, however, seriously limits the scope 
for simulations. 
Tax non-compliance (or tax evasion) is the other side of the coin and refers to intentional 
effort to lower tax liability in unlawful ways. In the context of tax-benefit models, this 
                                                 
29
 A number of US studies have focused on non-cash programs such as Food Stamps (e.g. Daponte et al., 1999; 
Haider et al., 2003) or The Special Supplemental Nutrition Program for Women, Infants, and Children (e.g. 
Bitler et al., 2003). 
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concerns primarily income tax and payroll tax evasion, in the form of under-reporting taxable 
income or over-reporting (income tax) deductions. Compared to benefit non take-up, this is 
an even more challenging issue for several reasons. First, while take-up is binary by nature 
(i.e. an eligible person either claims or not), tax compliance is often partial. Second, there is 
no single data source which would allow the precise measurement of tax evasion – while tax 
records contain income reported to the tax authority, “true” income remains unobserved. 
Third, evading taxes may also affect how related incomes are reported to surveys. These 
constraints point towards the need to combine and utilise multiple data sources to study tax 
evasion and help to explain why hard empirical evidence at the individual level is very 
scarce. 
Studies estimating the extent and determinants of tax non-compliance by individuals have 
mainly relied on audited tax records (e.g. Clotfelter, 1983; Feinstein, 1991; Erard, 1993 and 
1997; Erard and Ho, 2001; Martinez-Vazquez and Rider, 2005). Although tax audits are 
designed to detect tax non-compliance, these are typically not carried out randomly and target 
those more likely to evade on the basis of initial screening. Repeated and extensive random 
tax audits, from which insights into tax evasion can be inferred for a broader population, have 
been primarily carried out in the US. However, even audits are unable to detect all non-
compliance, especially income under-reporting where cash transactions are involved, and 
usually have very limited information on individual characteristics.  
Surveys offer a much richer set of information on individuals but usually lack a good 
measure of non-compliance. Some surveys include explicit questions on compliance (e.g. 
Forest and Sheffrin, 2002) but given its sensitivity the reliability of such self-reported data is 
unclear (Elffers et al., 1992). On the other hand, studies such as Pissarides and Weber (1989), 
Lyssioutou et al. (2004) and Hurst et al. (2014) have relied on indirect methods, employing 
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econometric models which contrast surveyed income and consumption. These, however, are 
inevitably cruder and allow for a less detailed analysis of compliance.  
Finally, laboratory experiments are common in tax compliance research, see e.g. Alm et al., 
(1992, 2009, 2012); Laury and Wallace (2005). While experiments allow one potential 
determinant to be isolated from the rest and for clearer conclusions to be drawn about 
causality, it is unclear how well conditions in the laboratory reflect the actual behaviour, not 
least as the subjects are typically students without substantial experience of paying taxes.  
Overall, there is substantial evidence on factors influencing people’s decision to evade taxes. 
There are also studies showing that tax non-compliance is more prevalent for income sources 
which are less easily tracked by the tax authority, see Klepper and Nagin (1989) and Kleven 
et al. (2011). For example, the extent of under-reporting income from self-employment is 
notably higher compared to wages and salaries as the latter are usually subject to third party 
reporting (i.e. by employers), which reduces opportunities for evasion (though does not 
necessarily eliminate these). Fewer studies have focused on the distributional implications of 
tax non-compliance (e.g. Johns and Slemrod, 2010; Doerrenberg and Duncan, 2013), some in 
combination with microsimulation modelling (Benedek and Lelkes, 2011; Leventi et al., 
2013). For reviews of theoretical and empirical literature on tax evasion, see Andreoni et al. 
(1998), Slemrod (2007) and Alm (2012). 
However, given the highly specific datasets that are often involved in the study of tax 
compliance, it is not straightforward to utilise previous findings in tax-benefit models nor is it 
easy to provide own estimates with the type of data commonly used for microsimulation. 
This helps to explain why attempts to account for tax non-compliance in tax-benefit models 
seem to remain very limited (e.g. Ceriani et al., 2013, Matsaganis and Leventi, 2013). On the 
other hand, this may partly also reflect the fact that microsimulation studies lack details on 
74 
 
such adjustments. Therefore, the first step towards improving the modelling of tax non-
compliance (as well as benefit take-up) is increasing transparency about how this is handled 
(if at all) in existing models and studies.  
4.3. Assessing the reliability of microsimulation estimates 
The overall credibility of a microsimulation model in simulating the effects of a given tax-
benefit policy encompasses different aspects, some of which are interrelated, and include the 
application of “sound principles of inference in the estimation, testing and validation” 
(Klevmarken, 2002). 
First, the reliability of a microsimulation model is closely tied to its validation and 
transparency which is indicated by the extent to which the internal features of the model and 
the validation of the results against external statistics are documented. Unfortunately, a high 
level of transparency does not characterise many of the microsimulation models used in the 
academic and policy literature, which tend to be “black boxes”. Good practice is to provide a 
detailed description of all tax-benefit components simulated, including details of assumptions 
used as well as information about the input data and related transformations or imputations. 
Documented validation of the output against external statistics on benefit recipients and 
taxpayers and total expenditure/revenue is also an important component of the informed use 
of microsimulation models.  
Nevertheless, such validation is not a comprehensive assessment for three reasons. First, as 
illustrated in section 4.1 above, microsimulation estimates and the information available in 
official statistics may not be comparable conceptually. Secondly, in some countries limited 
external information is available and in all it is rarely available without a time delay. Thirdly, 
while it is possible to validate results for existing and past systems it is usually not possible to 
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find independent estimates of the effects of policy reforms. A correct baseline does not 
ensure that the model or its input data can correctly estimate the effect of a reform.  
Second, as mentioned by Wolf (2004), a persistent failure of most microsimulation 
applications is the lack of recognition of the degree of statistical uncertainty associated with 
the results, some inherent in the sampling process that underlies the input micro-data and 
some propagated from simulation errors and estimated parameters. The accuracy of the 
underlying data, the correct and detailed representation of the tax-benefit rules and the actual 
implementation of the policy parameters in the simulation code determine the point-estimate 
of the simulated policy. Nevertheless, the correct interpretation of the results should take into 
account their statistical inference – an aspect often neglected in the microsimulation literature 
– which also depends on the nature of the model and whether it is purely deterministic or also 
involves probabilistic or econometric specifications.  
To start with, simulations are subject to the same degree of sampling error, measurement 
error, and misreporting as any other analysis based on survey data. On the one hand, as 
discussed in section 4.1, simulations can improve the accuracy of results by simulating the 
exact rules rather than relying on observed values which might be misreported. On the other 
hand, the simulation process can introduce other sources of errors due to, for example, 
approximations in the simulation of tax benefit rules, adjustments for non-compliance or non- 
take up, uprating of monetary parameters and socio-demographic characteristics to the 
simulation year or ignoring behavioural responses or market adjustments. 
In the case of simulation of the first-order effects of policy changes, Goedemé et al. (2013) 
argue that the lack of attention to the statistical significance of the results is undesirable and 
unjustified due to the availability of standard routines embedded in most standard statistical 
software. Moreover, when comparing the statistics related to different scenarios, they show 
76 
 
the importance of taking into account not only the sampling variance of the separate point 
estimates but also the covariance between simulated and baseline statistics which are based 
on the same underlying sample. This can lead to a generally high degree of precision of 
estimates of the effects of a reform on a particular statistic of interest. 
The situation is much less straightforward in the case of more complex simulations involving, 
for example, revenue-neutral reforms or behavioural reactions which add additional sources 
of uncertainty due to the use of estimated wage rates to construct the budget set and the 
preference parameters estimated using econometric models. Despite the growing literature on 
estimation of labour supply effects of policy changes (see section 3.3), there are only a few 
examples of studies focussing on the analytical properties of the sampling distribution of the 
microsimulation outcomes which are affected by simulation uncertainty and estimation 
uncertainty. The former stems from the simulated choice set that can be different from the 
one that an agent would choose in reality. The estimation variability comes from the 
sampling variability of the estimated parameters of the labour supply model (Aaberge et al., 
2000). Pudney and Sutherland (1994) derived the asymptotic sampling properties of the most 
important statistics usually reported in microsimulation studies taking into account the 
additional uncertainty introduced by the imposition of revenue neutrality in the construction 
of the confidence intervals. Pudney and Sutherland (1996) augmented the previous analysis 
deriving analytically the asymptotically-valid confidence intervals of a number of statistics of 
interest allowing for errors associated with sampling variability, econometric estimation of 
parameters of a multinomial logit model of female labour supply and stochastic simulation in 
the calculations. They concluded that the sampling error is the largest source of uncertainty 
but parameter estimation errors may add additional uncertainty which undermines the 
practical use of such behavioural models.  
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The complexity of the analytical solution associated with very detailed microsimulation 
model, rather complex policy simulation and sophisticated econometric models has lead to 
the use of more tractable empirical approaches. Creedy et al. (2007) opted for a simulation 
approach to approximate the sampling distribution of statistics of interest based on the 
sampling distribution of the estimated parameters. The approach relies on a number of draws 
from the parameter distribution of the underlying behavioural model. Moreover, they suggest 
a simpler and more practical approach in which the functional form of the sampling 
distribution is assumed to be normal, requiring a small number of draws from the parameter 
distribution and leading to generally accurate results. 
Furthermore, to avoid having to assume the normal distribution for stochastic terms, and 
exploiting the increasingly available computer power, assessing the statistical reliability of 
the estimates now commonly relies on re-sampling methods such as the bootstrap which 
allows one to obtain a set of replicated econometric estimates used in one or more simulation 
runs, whose variance is used to capture the variability of the statistics of interest. Although 
the additional uncertainty added by behavioural modelling is not found to be critical for most 
analysis (e.g. Bargain et al., 2014) there are reasons for concerns when the estimates refer to 
specific small demographic groups and further developments in this research area are needed.  
5. Broadening the Scope 
5.1. Extended income, consumption and indirect taxes  
Although disposable income is the most used indicator of living standard, it is widely 
recognised that economic well-being is a multidimensional concept (see Chapter 3 on 
Inequality, income and well-being by Fleurbaey et al.). The economic value of the 
consumption of goods and services, including inter-household transfers, in-kind benefits and 
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homeowners’ imputed rent related to the main accommodation, is often considered a better 
indicator than income to measure individual well-being on both theoretical and pragmatic 
grounds (Meyer and Sullivan, 2011). The exclusion of consumption expenditure and non-
cash income from empirical studies of the redistributive effect of the tax-benefit systems 
might also hamper cross-country comparison given the different degree of monetisation of 
the economy across countries. Moreover, the distributional impact of policy changes may be 
rather different if non-cash incomes and indirect taxes are included with important 
implications for the design of policies aiming to fight poverty and social exclusion, since 
such an omission may lead to imperfect targeting and misallocation of resources. 
Notwithstanding their importance, most microsimulation models do not include either in-kind 
benefits or indirect taxes, mainly due to data limitations. 
In-kind benefits, such as services related to child and elderly care, education, health and 
public housing, represent, in European countries, about half of welfare state support and 
contribute to reducing the inequality otherwise observed in the cash income distribution. The 
economic value of public in-kind benefits can be imputed at individual or household level on 
the basis of per capita spending considering the average cost of public services (such as 
providing care and education services), the gain from paying below-market rent or no rent at 
all for public housing or the risk-related insurance value approach that considers public health 
care services equivalent to purchasing an insurance policy with the same cost for individuals 
who have the same socio-demographic characteristics. See Aaberge et al. (2010a) and Paulus 
et al. (2010) for empirical evidence across European countries and for methodological 
insights on the derivation of needs-adjusted equivalence scales which are more appropriate 
for extended income. However, survey data usually do not include enough information to 
simulate changes in the value of the benefit due to policy reforms, nor take into account the 
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real utilisation by the individual, the quality of the public service, or the discretion in the 
provision usually applied by local authorities (Aaberge et al., 2010b). 
A more comprehensive measure of individual command over resources should include the 
income value of home ownership as well. This is because the consumption opportunities of 
homeowners (or individuals living in reduced or free rent housing) differ from those of other 
individuals due to the imputed rent that represents what they would pay if they lived in 
accommodation rented at market prices. The inclusion of imputed rent in microsimulation 
models is becoming more common due to the refinement of different methods to derive a 
measure of imputed rent (Frick et al., 2010) and also a renewed interest in property taxation. 
In a cross-country perspective, Figari et al. (2012b) analyse the extent to which including 
imputed rent in taxable income affects the short run distribution of income and work 
incentives, showing a small inequality-reducing effect together with a non trivial increase in 
tax revenue. This offers the opportunity to shift the fiscal burden away from labour and to 
increase the incentive to work for low income individuals. 
Indirect taxes typically represent around 30% of government revenue. With only few 
exceptions, household income surveys used as input data for microsimulation models do not 
include detailed information on expenditures either, preventing micro-level analysis of the 
combined effect of direct and indirect taxation. The solution usually adopted to overcome this 
data limitation is to impute information on expenditures into income surveys (Sutherland et 
al., 2002). Decoster et al. (2010, 2011) provide a thoughtful discussion of the methodological 
challenges and a detailed explanation of the procedure implemented in the context of 
EUROMOD for a number of European countries. Detailed information on expenditure at 
household level is derived from national expenditure surveys where goods are usually 
aggregated according to the Classification of Individual Consumption by Purpose (COICOP), 
identifying, for example, aggregates such as food, private transport, durables. The value of 
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each aggregate of expenditure is imputed into income surveys by means of parametric Engel 
curves based on disposable income and a set of common socio-economic characteristics 
present both in income and expenditure datasets. In order to prevent an unsatisfactory 
matching quality in the tails of the income-expenditure distributions, a two-step matching 
procedure can be implemented by first estimating the total expenditures and total durable 
expenditures upon disposable income and socio-demographic characteristics and then 
predicting the budget share of each COICOP category of goods. Moreover, the matching 
procedure takes into account the individual propensity for some activities, such as smoking, 
renting, using public transportation and education services, which are not consumed by a 
large majority of individuals. Individual indirect tax liability is then simulated according to 
the legislation in place in each country, considering a weighted average tax rate for each 
COICOP category of goods imputed in the data. 
Most microsimulation models that include the simulation of indirect taxes rely on the 
assumption of fixed producer prices, with indirect taxes fully passed to the final price paid by 
the consumer. To relax such an assumption one should go beyond a partial equilibrium 
framework and link the micro-simulation models to macro models (see Section 3.4) in order 
to consider the producer as well as consumer response to specific reforms or economy-wide 
shocks. There is some variety in the ways in which the models deal with the estimation of 
changes in spending patterns due to the simulated reforms (Capéau et al., 2014). Some 
models simulate only a non-behavioural first round impact (i.e. quantities or expenditures are 
kept fixed at the initial level) while others estimate partial behavioural reactions taking into 
account the income effect on demand for goods and services by means of Engel curves 
(Decoster et al., 2010) or even full demand systems accounting for the real income effect and 
the relative price effects (Abramovksy et al., 2012).  
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The inclusion of indirect taxes also raises the question of how to measure their incidence. 
Table 1 shows the incidence of indirect tax payments for three European countries expressed 
as a percentage of disposable income and as a percentage of expenditure, by decile of 
equivalised disposable income. In the first case (see the left panel of the table) the 
regressivity of indirect tax payments is clear: poorer individuals pay a larger proportion of 
their income in indirect taxes compared to richer individuals mainly due to a larger 
propensity to consume, or even dissaving reflected by the average expenditures exceeding 
incomes for the individuals at the bottom of the income distribution (Decoster et al., 2010). 
However, survey data might suffer from measurement error, in particular from income under-
recording (Brewer and O’Dea, 2012), which could give a misleading snapshot of the income-
consumption pattern at the bottom of the income distribution.  
Table 1. Incidence of indirect tax payments  
Income 
decile 
As % of disposable income As % of expenditures 
Belgium Greece UK Belgium Greece UK 
1 15.3 37.7 20.2 11.3 13.5 13.9 
2 12.0 23.4 13.5 11.8 13.9 14.0 
3 11.7 19.8 12.6 12.1 14.3 13.8 
4 11.6 18.4 12.4 12.5 14.2 13.8 
5 11.4 17.6 11.8 12.7 14.2 14.1 
6 11.0 16.0 11.6 12.8 14.1 14.3 
7 10.9 16.0 11.1 13.1 14.6 14.5 
8 10.8 14.9 10.7 13.3 14.2 14.7 
9 10.5 14.2 9.9 13.5 14.3 14.6 
10 9.9 11.9 8.2 13.9 14.1 14.4 
Total 11.1 16.0 10.8 12.9 14.2 14.3 
Notes: decile groups are formed by ranking individuals according to equivalised household disposable income 
using the modified OECD equivalence scale. Source: Figari and Paulus (2013) based on EUROMOD. 
In the second case (i.e. the right panel of the table), indirect tax payments are progressive and 
poorer individuals pay a slightly smaller proportion of their total expenditure in VAT and 
excises compared to richer individuals. The main reason for this is that the goods that are 
exempt from VAT or subject to a lower rate (e.g. food, energy, domestic fuel, children’s 
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clothing) represent a much larger share of total spending of poorer individuals than of richer 
individuals (Figari and Paulus, 2013). The distributional pattern of the indirect taxes being 
regressive with respect to disposable income and proportional or progressive with respect to 
expenditure reinforces, on empirical grounds, the importance of the choice of the 
measurement stick that should be used as a benchmark in the welfare analysis (Decoster et 
al., 2010; Capéau et al., 2014). 
The potential of microsimulation models that are capable of simulating direct and indirect 
taxes within the same framework is reinforced by the renewed interest in the tax shift from 
direct to indirect taxation in order to enhance the efficiency of the tax system (Decoster and 
van Camp, 2001; Decoster et al., 2010). In particular, microsimulation models have been 
used to assess the distributional consequences of a “fiscal devaluation”, a revenue-neutral 
shift from payroll taxes toward value-added taxes that might induce a reduction in labour 
costs, an increase in net exports and a compression of imports, with an overall improvement 
in the trade balance (de Mooij and Keen, 2013; European Commission, 2013). 
Two general considerations arise from the use of microsimulation models for the analysis of 
the redistributive effects of indirect taxes. On the one hand, the actual degree of regressivity 
of indirect taxes might be less than that observed if surveys tend to underreport income more 
than consumption at the bottom of the income distribution (Brewer and O’Dea, 2012; Meyer 
and Sullivan, 2011). On the other hand, a more systematic use of simulated income values as 
generated by a microsimulation model rather than as observed in the data can help in solving 
the underreporting of income values, closing the gap between reported income and 
consumption and providing a more robust indicator of living standards for those with a low 
level of resources.  
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5.2. Dynamic microsimulation and lifetime redistribution 
The importance of investigating the “long-range character” of public policies was already 
highlighted by Guy Orcutt in the 1950s (Orcutt, 1957) and pioneered through his work in the 
1970s on DYNASIM, a dynamic microsimulation model of the US designed to analyse the 
long term consequences of retirement and ageing issues (Orcutt et al., 1976). A number of 
reviews survey the existing dynamic microsimulation models, the methodological challenges 
and the type of uses providing an overall picture of the evolution of the state of play and 
future research directions for interested readers (Harding, 1993, 1996b; Mitton et al., 2000; 
Gupta and Harding, 2007, Harding and Gupta, 2007; Li and O’Donoghue, 2013).  
Dynamic microsimulation models extend the time frame of the analysis in order to address 
the long-term distributional consequences of policy changes, widening the perspective of the 
effects of the policies to encompass the individual lifetime and addressing questions about 
intra-personal redistribution over the lifecycle (Harding, 1993). Dynamic microsimulation 
models typically aim to capture two main factors that shape the income distribution in a long-
term perspective. First, they cover the changing structure of the population due to evolving 
individual and household characteristics (such as age, education, household composition) and 
life events (such as marriage, household formation, birth, migration). Second, they capture 
the interaction of market mechanisms (e.g. labour market participation, earnings levels) and 
the tax-benefit system with such characteristics in each point in time.  
In particular, they are useful tools to analyse: i) the performance of long-term policies such as 
pensions and other social insurance programmes such as health and long term care, ii) the 
consequences of different demographic scenarios, iii) the evolution of inter-temporal 
processes and behaviours such as wealth accumulation and intergenerational transfers, and iv) 
the geographical trend of social and economic activities if dynamic microsimulation models 
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are supplemented with spatial information (Bourguignon and Bussolo, 2013; Li and 
O’Donoghue, 2013). 
The methodological challenges behind a microsimulation model depend on the scope of the 
events taken into account and the methodology used to age the population of interest through 
the period of analysis. The ageing process can be either static or dynamic. With the static 
ageing method the individual observations are re-weighted to match existing or hypothetical 
projections of variables of interest. The approach is relatively straightforward but it can 
become unsatisfactory if the number of variables to be considered simultaneously is large or 
if one is interested in following individual transitions from one point in time to the next (see 
also section 3.5.1). The dynamic ageing method builds up a synthetic longitudinal dataset by 
simulating individual transition probabilities conditioned on past history and cohort 
constraints that take into account the evolution of the socio-demographic characteristics of 
interest through the time horizon of the analysis (Klevmarken, 2008). The major source of 
information for the estimation of the dynamic processes is derived from longitudinal data 
available in most developed countries although often the duration of the panel is not long 
enough to observe transitions for large samples of individuals, the main exceptions being the 
long panel data available in Australia, Germany, the UK and the US. Transitions can be 
estimated through reduced form models that incorporate deterministic and stochastic 
components or simulated taking into account behavioural reactions of individuals to other 
changes which occurred at the same time, based on individual preferences estimated through 
structural models that take into account the endogeneity of some individual transition 
probabilities (see section 3.3).  
The ageing of individual and household characteristics can be implemented as a discrete or 
continuous process. The former is usually built around yearly time intervals; it is more 
straightforward but implies that some simulated events might not respect the real sequence. 
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The latter is based on survival functions that consider the joint hazard of occurrence of the 
simulated events. 
In principle, dynamic microsimulation models allow for analysis which is more in line with 
the theoretical arguments in favour of a lifetime approach to the analysis of the redistributive 
effects of tax-benefit systems as developed in the welfare economics literature (Creedy, 
1999a). Nelissen (1998) is one of the few examples where the annual and lifetime 
redistributive effects of the social security system (here for the Netherlands) are analysed 
simultaneously, making use of the same microsimulation model that guarantees comparable 
simulations of the tax-benefit system in place over a long period of time. In line with other 
research (e.g. Harding, 1993), Nelissen (1998) finds that the lifetime redistributive effect is 
considerably smaller than the annual incidence with important policy implications due to the 
different incidence of various pension schemes on different generations. 
Due to the complexity of the ageing process, early dynamic microsimulation models tended 
not to address the long term implications of policy and policy change on the income 
distribution as a whole (i.e. population-based models) but rather focussed on specific cohorts 
of population (cohort models). Nowadays such a distinction is less significant due to the 
improvements in the modelling set up as well as major improvements in available computing 
power. However, despite the improvements in dynamic microsimulation modelling, such 
models are often perceived as black-boxes making it difficult to understand and appreciate 
their properties. In particular, the lack of good economic theory and sound econometric 
inference methods are thought to contribute to a sceptical view of these models by the 
economics profession (Klevmarken, 2008). 
Two particular research developments characterise the dynamic microsimulation field. First, 
this is an area where international collaborations are emerging in an attempt to reduce the 
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efforts needed to build very complex models. The Life-Cycle Income Analysis Model 
(LIAM) stands out as a viable option to provide a general framework for the construction of 
new dynamic microsimulation models (O’Donoghue et al., 2009) and to be linked to 
EUROMOD (and other modular-based microsimulation models) in order to exploit the 
existing parameterisation of tax-benefit systems for the European countries (Liégeois and 
Dekkers, 2014). Second, most dynamic microsimulation models do not include macro 
feedback effects and do not have market clearing mechanisms that would require ambitious 
links to macro models (Bourguignon and Bussolo, 2013). However, due to the number and 
complexity of the interactions between many social and economic variables involved in the 
modelling, the integration between dynamic micro and macro models could introduce too 
much uncertainty in the results to make them useful in a policy context (Li and O’Donoghue, 
2013). 
5.3. Crossing boundaries: sub- and supra- national modelling 
The natural territorial scope for a microsimulation model is a country or nation. This is 
because in most countries some or all of the tax-benefit system is legislated and administered 
nationally, because the micro-data that are used as an input dataset are representative at 
national level, other data used to update, adjust and validate the model are usually made 
available at national level, and because the economy and society are usually assumed to exist 
and operate at this level. However, in some countries policies can vary across regions, 
sometimes following from (or accompanied by) major differences in politics, history and 
economic and social characteristics. In some cases the data that are especially suitable as the 
basis for micro-simulation modelling are only available for one region. For these reasons 
models may exist for single regions, or national models may be able to capture regional 
differences in policy. Examples of regional or sub-national models include Decancq et al. 
(2012) for Flanders (Belgium) and Azzolini et al. (2014) for Trentino (Italy): both are based 
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on the EUROMOD framework and the latter exploits a rich dataset that combines 
administrative and survey data. Examples of national modelling exercises that capture 
extensive regional differences in policies include Cantó et al. (2014) for Spain. 
If the micro-data are representative of each region, then the national model can operate as a 
federation of regional models, also capturing any national policy competencies. As well as 
simulating the appropriate policy rules regardless of location (many models for countries with 
regional policy variation simply opt to simulate policies from a single “representative” 
region), these federal models can identify the implied flows of resources (redistribution) 
between regions as well as within them, given budget constraints at either national or regional 
level. In the US, the most comprehensive in terms of policy coverage is the long-standing 
microsimulation model, TRIM3, which simulates welfare programs as well as taxes and 
regional variation in programs, making use of a common national input dataset: the Current 
Population Survey (CPS) Annual Social and Economic Supplement (ASEC). 30  See, for 
example, Wheaton et al. (2011) who compare the effects of policies on poverty across three 
US states. For Canada, the microsimulation model SPSD/M has been linked to a regional 
input-output model in order to capture some of the indirect effects of national or provincial 
tax-benefit policy changes at the provincial level (Cameron and Ezzeddin, 2000). 
In the European Union (EU) policies in the 28 Member States vary in structure and purpose 
to a much greater degree than across US states. Although the EU-SILC data is output 
harmonised by Eurostat it is far from ideal as an input database for a microsimulation model 
(Figari et al., 2007) and significant amounts of nationally-specific adjustments are needed to 
provide the input data for EUROMOD, the only EU-wide model (see Box 1). Indeed, 
although the supra-national administration of the EU has no relevant policy-making powers 
(at the time of writing), analysis which considers the EU (or the eurozone) as a whole is 
                                                 
30
 http://trim3.urban.org  
88 
 
highly relevant to approaching the design of tax-benefit policy measures to encourage 
economic stabilisation and social cohesion. Analogously to regionalised national models, 
EUROMOD is able to draw out the implications of potential EU-level policy reforms for 
between- as well as within-country redistribution (Levy et al., 2013), policy harmonisation 
and stabilisation (Bargain et al., 2013a), as well as for the EU income distribution.  
At the other extreme, microsimulation methods have been used to estimate income 
distribution and other indicators for small areas. This relies on spatial microsimulation 
techniques (Tanton and Edwards, 2013) or, more commonly, re-weighting national or 
regional micro-data so that key characteristics match those from census data for the small 
area (Tanton et al., 2011). The primary policy use of these models in the developed world 
generally is to predict the demand for services such as care facilities (for example, Lymer et 
al. (2009) for Australia and Wu and Birkin (2013) for the UK). In circumstances where the 
census data provide a good indication of income levels, such as in Australia, they have also 
been used to provide small area estimates of income distribution and its components (Tanton 
et al., 2009). Linkage of the census with household budget survey data in the UK has been 
used to estimate the small area effects of an increase in VAT (Anderson et al., 2014). A 
similar method known as “poverty mapping” has been applied to developing countries by 
Elbers et al. (2003) using household budget surveys and census micro-data in order to 
monitor the geographic concentration of poverty and to evaluate geographic targeting of the 
poor as a way of re-balancing growing welfare disparities between geographic areas. See, for 
Vietnam, Lanjouw et al. (2013). 
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6. Conclusions and outlook for the future 
6.1. What has been achieved so far? 
Tax-benefit modelling is now in widespread use to provide evidence in the policy-making 
process. Tax-benefit models are used within governments to provide costings of policy 
reforms and impact assessments of distributional and incentive effects. They are used to 
assess progress towards meeting targets within relevant policy domains (and may be used to 
set feasible targets in the first place). They are used to explore the implications of alternative 
reform options. Other participants in the policy-making process (opposition political parties, 
special interest groups, NGOs, international organisations and civil society generally) may 
also put forward their own perspectives and alternative proposals on the basis of 
microsimulation analysis. All of them may draw on the growing body of microsimulation-
informed economic analysis from academic research. Within academia, microsimulation is 
also now an accepted and recognised part of the toolbox in applied public economics, other 
branches of applied economics and other disciplines such as quantitative social policy, 
sociology and political science. Evidence for this is provided by the increasing frequency of 
publication of articles making use of microsimulation in mainstream journals, as is clear from 
the references included in this chapter, and reliance on microsimulation analysis in the 
economic debate as illustrated by the Mirrlees Review (2010).  
Microsimulation modelling provides an opportunity for fruitful links between the policy-
making and academic communities. There are many instances where methodological 
developments within academic policy-focussed research have provided new and more 
sophisticated tools that can be adopted for use by policy-making institutions. One example is 
the modelling of labour supply responses which is increasingly included in microsimulation 
models used by government agencies. There are also instances where innovation has taken 
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place within government agencies in response to particular policy needs as well as instances 
of the analytical needs of policy-makers providing the impetus for academic developments. 
One example from the European Union is the adoption of social targets for Europe 2020 and 
the need to develop methods of forecasting micro-level indicators. Forging such links can 
bring additional benefit in the form of more open channels of communication with the official 
producers and providers of micro-data about the data requirements of microsimulation 
models and the potential benefits to policy-making.  
In our view there are four major strands of technical/methodological achievement and 
ongoing progress in the use of tax-benefit microsimulation for the analysis of policy and 
income inequality. A formal framework for disentangling the effect of policies on income 
distribution is an important step towards helping to understand better how various studies 
have approached measuring these effects and their consistency. A coherent framework can no 
doubt greatly increase the clarity and transparency of microsimulation studies and facilitate 
links with other relevant methodological literature. The devil is in the details and 
microsimulation modelling offers these in abundance.31  
Behavioural microsimulation is no longer limited to the academic sphere and it has an 
increasing impact on policy motivated analysis. Further developments of behavioural models 
in terms of policy scope (e.g. extending the economic modelling to cover areas such as 
housing, mobility and saving) and their robustness based on the comparison with ex-post 
evaluation studies may strengthen their role in the policy and economic debate. Moreover, the 
cross-fertilization between the analytical and the computational approach to the optimal 
taxation problem based on behavioural microsimulation models could reinforce the link 
between public finance theory and applied research. 
                                                 
31
 Furthermore, as Spielauer (2011, p. 18) has reflected: “If beauty is to be found in simplicity and mathematical 
elegance (a view not uncommon in mainstream economics), microsimulation models violate all rules of 
aesthetics.”  
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The analysis of tax-benefit policies with a clear impact on the labour market participation and 
the evaluation of the impact of macroeconomic shocks would clearly benefit from the 
availability of counterfactuals that consider feedback effects between micro and macro 
level. A fully integrated micro-macro model, although daunting in terms of time and 
resources required, is potentially an incredibly powerful tool to go beyond the partial 
equilibrium framework in which microsimulation models operate and to disentangle the 
effects of macro changes on individual resources, and also to extend the policy scope of the 
analysis through the linkage to e.g. environmental models. However, the practical, conceptual 
and methodological challenges are formidable. Even so, falling short of full model 
integration, improving methods of linking microsimulation analysis to macroeconomic data 
in various ways has been, and remains, an important part of the developing toolbox. 
Cross country comparisons of the effects of policies, and especially policy swap analysis, 
inform our understanding of the variation in effects of policies in different economic and 
socio-demographic contexts and, at the same time, offer the opportunity for cross-country 
“policy learning”. The development of EUROMOD, and other multi-country models, has 
facilitated carrying out this type of analysis while maintaining comparability of concepts and 
measurement and consistency in the operation of policy rules. There is potential to extend the 
approach to other global regions than the EU such as southern Africa, Latin America or the 
Balkan region (within each of which, arguably, policy learning is most relevant). There is 
also potential to extend beyond the EU to include all OECD countries to aid comparisons, for 
example, between the EU and the US.  
There is room for improvement and for development in two key areas. The first relates to the 
data and methods that are available for input into and adoption by microsimulation models. 
Our understanding of how available micro-data may be improved and reconciled with other 
information, as well as the potential of new forms and sources of data which may improve the 
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quality and scope of simulation or facilitate linkage with other models (macro, environmental 
etc) are areas for attention. In terms of methodological improvements, more attention is 
clearly needed to assess statistical significance and reliability of results obtained with 
microsimulation models drawing on various statistical methods.  
The second area for improvement relates to the organisation of microsimulation activities. 
There is much the duplication of effort (with many models doing the same or similar things in 
some countries), combined with problems of lack of transparency (i.e. lack of documentation, 
results that are not reproducible by others). Furthermore, most existing models are not made 
available or accessible to the people who might make use of them. The final two sub-sections 
explore the outlook for microsimulation and policy analysis along these two dimensions. 
6.2. Data and methodological developments 
Microsimulation models require access to appropriate and good quality micro-datasets that 
are themselves well-documented and validated against independent information. The trend 
towards making more use of register (i.e. administrative) data to supply information on 
income receipt (and in some cases many other variables) is welcome in the sense that it 
reduces measurement problems and under-reporting and potentially frees up resources (e.g. 
survey interview time) for the collection of more or better quality data in other dimensions. 
At the same time, such linkage may introduce new problems. It may delay the timing of 
delivery of the micro-data if there are limits on the speed of obtaining and processing 
administrative information. Use of administrative information may raise new concerns about 
data confidentiality which may result in additional restrictions on the ways in which the 
datasets can be accessed and by whom. There seem to be trade-offs between using high 
precision data and widespread access.  
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Technological developments may offer possible ways around these trade-offs if models and 
their micro-level data (both input and output) are housed on a suitably secure server and 
accessed remotely. This is a mode of working that was pioneered for income distribution 
analysis by LIS32 and, in spite of the additional complexities associated with microsimulation 
modelling, has also been successfully deployed in a few other cases. These include the 
WIDER African models referred to above, as well as two adaptations of national components 
of EUROMOD: Mefisto for Flanders (Decancq et al., 2012) and Soresi for Austria. 33 In each 
of these cases the broad aim of the models is to provide access to modelling capacity by civil 
society, with the simulation and output options offered to users structured and restricted 
accordingly. More critically in this context, in each case the providers of the input micro-data 
have given permission for such access over the web. It remains to be seen whether it will be 
possible to make use of high-precision administrative data in this way. Even so, there would 
be other technical and pedagogical challenges to be overcome in offering to the public the 
full flexibility of a model like EUROMOD using remote access.  
More generally there is potential to extend the policy scope and applicability of 
microsimulation models through the statistical linkage of data from different sources. Given 
the increasing complexity of tax-benefit systems that operate through direct and indirect 
taxes, wealth and property taxes, and cash and non-cash benefits, microsimulation models 
can help in understanding the overall effect on individual material well-being only if more 
comprehensive surveys become available, cross-links between various administrative datasets 
are utilised further or systematic and rigorous matching procedures are implemented and 
documented. A prime example is the analysis of the effects of indirect taxes where any 
conclusion about incidence and regressivity of taxes can be easily biased by the data 
                                                 
32
 http://www.lisdatacenter.org/  
33
 http://soresi.bmask.gv.at/Mefisto/#  
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inconsistency observed in particular at the tails of the income distribution, see Decoster et al. 
(2010) and Brewer and O’Dea (2012).  
Finally, making progress on many of the technical challenges associated with 
microsimulation modelling, most notably the modelling of take-up and compliance 
behaviour, is also inhibited by lack of suitable data. For example, non-receipt of a benefit 
entitlement may be explained in many ways ranging from (among other causes) measurement 
error in the survey responses, lack of information about eligibility on the part of a non-
claimant or a decision not to claim due to the costs of claiming. It is likely that the relative 
importance of each factor varies with national context and specific benefit. Accurate 
modelling of the probability of taking up (i.e. receiving, given positive entitlement) a 
particular benefit in principle needs to take any one or many possible causes into account 
which typically would be demanding in terms of the data requirements. Modelling of tax non-
compliance at the individual level is even more demanding given the concealed nature of 
such activities and a potentially wider range of possible factors and interactions at play. 
Progress in these areas can therefore be expected to be patchy and uneven, depending on the 
specific problems and the data possibilities.  
6.3. The case for a collaborative approach 
Few models are accessible beyond their producers. This leads to a proliferation of many 
similar models and the (largely wasteful) duplication of effort that this involves. It also limits 
access to models because building from scratch is time consuming and requires specialist 
skills; there are significant barriers to entry. Furthermore, the need to provide in the public 
domain documentation or validation of models that are essentially private to their producers 
is rarely acted upon. This lack of transparency inhibits proper evaluation of microsimulation-
based studies and lack of access inhibits reproducibility of microsimulation analysis. 
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Together these factors may reduce the chances of microsimulation-based studies being 
published in the best scientific journals. As Wolfson (2009, p. 29) says: 
 “.... microsimulation modelling still has not achieved the kind of scientific status it deserves. 
One reason is that many potential users are concerned about the 'black box' nature of 
microsimulation models. An important step, therefore, is for microsimulation modelling to 
become a 'glass box' activity, including for example public availability of the model and open 
source code.” 
Models are also expensive to maintain and keep up to date. If there were fewer, better models 
that were made generally accessible this would improve efficiency and quality. A 
collaborative approach would also bring the various types of use and user closer together and, 
with the appropriate level of (technical) model flexibility could also facilitate innovations 
such as model linkages. EUROMOD and TAXSIM provide two rather different examples of 
models which already take this approach. EUROMOD makes available both tax-benefit 
codes and input data to anyone with permission to access the original micro-data sources, 
while TAXSIM provides only the tax code that may be linked to input data of the user’s own 
choosing.34  
Of course there are also good reasons why microsimulation models are developed as 
individually- or institutionally- private investments. In some cases the necessary micro-data 
cannot be made available more widely (e.g. in the case of government models, especially 
those using administrative data). In the academic sphere there are few incentives to share 
technical developments as public goods in the matter suggested, especially if they embody a 
large time investment and if they do not themselves attract academic reward.  
                                                 
34
 In addition there are the web-based simplified models referred to above, as well as some web-based 
developments including the French model OpenFisca http://www.openfisca.fr/  
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If the benefits of an open and collaborative approach are to be realised the main challenges 
are to find ways of organising and funding such arrangements that take account of the long 
term investment aspect, due to the need to maintain models as well as engage in initial 
construction. This would include developing an incentive structure that recognised the 
academic value of the work done on the “public good” research infrastructure while eliciting 
contributions in some form from the users of the models who might otherwise “free ride”. In 
the end, cooperation within the microsimulation community and particularly between 
academic researchers and policy makers will contribute to the integration of use of 
microsimulation for policy analysis into the mainstream of economic policy-making 
(Atkinson, 2009). 
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Appendix A: Increasing UK Child Benefit in 2001 and 2013: the net effects 
In both 2001 and 2013 the UK Child Benefit was delivered as a universal benefit for all 
children under the age of 19 in full time non-advanced education. In both years there were 
two rates, one for the oldest child (£15.50 and £20.30 respectively, per week) and one for any 
other children (£10.35 and £13.40 respectively, per week). As an illustration, we double these 
values and use EUROMOD to calculate the net budgetary cost after the operation of the rest 
of the tax and benefit systems, and also show how the gain per child would vary across the 
household income distribution.  
In 2001 Child Benefit was disregarded by the income tax system but was taken into account 
for the assessment of Income Support (and income-related Job Seeker’s Allowance), Housing 
Benefit and Council Tax Benefit, some of the main UK means-tested benefits for working 
age people and their families. (Working Families Tax Credit disregarded Child Benefit.) As 
the table shows, while the gross cost of the increase in Child Benefit is estimated as £8.85 
billion per year, once the reduced entitlements to these benefits are taken into account, the net 
cost falls to £7.01 billion or (79% of the gross). 
In contrast, in the 2013 system, Child Benefit is disregarded in the assessment of all means-
tested payments but higher-income parents who pay income tax at the 40% (or higher) 
marginal rate have the value of their Child Benefit included in their tax calculation. Thus, as 
shown in the table, the cost of the increase in Child Benefit is offset to a small extent by an 
increase in income tax liabilities. In addition, in 2013 there was a cap on the overall sum of 
benefits that could be received by families in some circumstances. This would result in some 
families not receiving all or any of their Child Benefit increase. In 2013 the gross cost of the 
increase in Child Benefit is estimated as £11.55 billion per year and once the reduced 
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entitlements to these benefits are taken into account, the net cost falls to £11.14 billion or 
(96% of the gross). 
Gross and net cost of doubling Child Benefit 2001 and 2013  
 2001 2013 
 
£ million per 
year 
% of gross 
cost 
£ million per 
year 
% of gross 
cost 
Child Benefit 8,850  100  11,549  100  
Income tax 0  0  -290  -3  
Income Support -1,606  -18  0  0  
Housing Benefit -152  -2  0  0  
Council Tax 
Benefit 
-81  -1  0  0  
Benefit cap 0  0  -123  -1  
Net cost 7,011  79  11,136  96  
Source: EUROMOD version F6.20 using Family Resources Survey data for 2008/9, adjusted to 2001 and 2013 
prices and incomes. 
There are different distributional consequences of these differences between gross and net 
effects, as shown in the Figure below. This shows the average net weekly increase in income 
per child by decile group of equivalised household income under the 2001 and 2013 policy 
systems. Under the 2001 system those in the lower income groups receive less, because some 
of the additional income is withdrawn as reduced entitlement to means-tested benefit. (This 
applies to a lesser extent in the bottom decile group where families simulated to not take up 
their entitlements to means-tested benefits are mainly located.) In 2013 however, it is 
children in higher income households who benefit to a lesser extent, due to the claw-back 
through income tax (the effect of the benefit cap is small and concentrated in the lower-
middle of the distribution).  
116 
 
Doubling child benefit in the UK: average net gain per child in £/week 
 
Notes: Deciles are based on equivalised household disposable income in the respective years and are 
constructed using the modified OECD equivalence scale to adjust incomes for differences in household size and 
composition. The lowest income group is labelled “1” and the highest “10”. Source: EUROMOD version F6.20 
using Family Resources Survey data for 2008/9, adjusted to 2001 and 2013 prices and incomes. 
The point of this illustration is to demonstrate how the interactions matter and need to be 
understood in designing policy scenarios. Similarly, the policy analyst needs to account for 
the interactions in order to understand the effects of policy changes. If in 2001 a policymaker 
had wanted to double the payment made to all children they would have needed to increase 
child amounts within the other benefits as well as in Child Benefit. On the other hand, if the 
goal had been to reduce the number of families subject to means tests (without anyone losing) 
then the illustrative reform would have done just that (for example, reducing the number of 
all households receiving Council Tax Benefit). If the goal in 2013 had been to reduce the 
reach of means-testing, the means-tested payment rates for children would have needed to be 
reduced at the same time as the Child Benefit increase.  
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Appendix B: Comparison of simulated estimates of income tax with 
administrative statistics, UK 2010/11 
Here we illustrate the type of validation of simulated income tax that can be carried out when 
published tables from administrative data of tax revenue by income band are available. The 
exercise also suggests ways in which the input micro-data might be adjusted, or not. Here, the 
input data are the UK Family Resources Survey (FRS) 2009/10 updated to 2010/11 incomes 
and prices.  
Simulated income tax liabilities are compared with statistics on income tax paid by band of 
taxable income, published by the UK revenue authority (HMRC, Table 3.3). The first point to 
note is that tax paid in any year may not match liability for tax on income earned in that year, 
because of adjustments carried over from previous years.  
The first row in the top panel of the table below shows the ratio of microsimulation model 
(EUROMOD) estimates to those of HMRC in three dimensions: the number of taxpayers 
(defined as individuals with positive taxable income before deduction of any personal 
allowances), their total taxable income (before deduction of allowances), and the total tax 
liability/revenue. The number of taxpayers is under-estimated by 7% and taxable income by 
more: 13%. Also shown are the ratios for the lowest taxable income group (under £10,000 
per year) and highest income group (over £150,000).35  
  
                                                 
35
 The HMRC statistics provide more detail for top incomes (the top two groups being £0.5 million to £1 million 
and £1million+). However, although the overall sample size of the FRS is large by international standards 
(31,644 individuals in 2009/10) the numbers with very high incomes are too small to analyse. There are 99 
observations with taxable income in excess of £150,000, including 13 with more than £500,000 and just 2 with 
more than £1 million (after adjustment to 2010/11 income levels). As explained in the main text, this is partly 
due to under-representation of, or under reporting by, people with very high incomes in the survey. However, 
even if their incomes were properly represented, based on the HMRC statistics there would still be fewer than 
30 observations with incomes above £500,000 in a sample of this size.    
118 
 
Ratio of EUROMOD estimates to HMRC statistics 
  
  Taxpayers Taxable income Tax revenue 
EUROMOD       
  All 0.93 0.87 0.85 
  taxable income < £10K 0.99 0.98 0.76 
  taxable income £150K+ 0.46 0.42 0.46 
EUROMOD with proportional adjustment to number of taxpayers (adj1) 
  All 1.00 0.93 0.91 
  taxable income < £10K 1.06 1.05 0.82 
  taxable income £150K+ 0.50 0.45 0.49 
EUROMOD with adjustment to number of taxpayers by income band (adj2) 
  All 1.00 0.98 1.05 
  taxable income < £10K 1.00 1.00 0.79 
  taxable income £150K+ 1.00 0.89 0.98 
Notes: EUROMOD-adj1 makes a proportional adjustment to the number of taxpayers in each income group, to 
match HMRC. EUROMOD-adj2 adjusts the number of taxpayers in each income group to match those given by 
HMRC. Sources: EUROMOD version F6.20 using Family Resources Survey 2009/10 updated to 2010/11 
incomes. HMRC http://www.hmrc.gov.uk/statistics/income-by-year.htm%202010-11%20Table%203.3.  
The low income group and their taxable income is well-represented by the FRS data but the 
tax revenue simulated by EUROMOD is too low by 24%. The difference in tax liability based 
on current year incomes (EUROMOD calculations) and tax revenue (HMRC) can arise if the 
latter contains tax due on higher previous year incomes, for example by the self-employed. 
The symmetrical effect (revenue smaller than liability, as incomes rise), which in general is 
equally likely, is not observable because it is distributed throughout the rest of the 
distribution of taxable income.  
The high income group of taxpayers and their income and tax paid are all under-represented 
by more than 50%. This is consistent with either or both the under-representation of very high 
income-earners in the survey, or the under-reporting of high incomes. 
More detail of the pattern of tax revenue by range of taxable income can be seen in the Figure 
below. The black bars show the HMRC estimates and the white bars, those using 
119 
 
EUROMOD simulations. EUROMOD shows some shortfall in most income ranges but the 
effect is concentrated in the highest income group.  
Estimates of income tax revenue by range of taxable income 2010/11 
 
Notes: EUROMOD-adj1 makes a proportional adjustment to the number of taxpayers in each income group, to 
match HMRC. EUROMOD-adj2 adjusts the number of taxpayers in each income group to match those given by 
HMRC. Sources: EUROMOD version F6.20 using Family Resources Survey 2009/10 updated to 2010/11 
incomes. HMRC http://www.hmrc.gov.uk/statistics/income-by-year.htm%202010-11%20Table%203.3. 
The overall shortfall in taxpayers might be explained by under-reporting of income by the 
whole distribution or parts of it, or by the fact that a proportion of UK income taxpayers are 
not resident in UK households and hence not captured by the survey data.36 We carry out two 
adjustments to the comparison of EUROMOD and HMRC statistics (not to the micro-data) in 
order to explore these possibilities. First (adj1) we make a proportional adjustment to the 
three statistics reported in the table such that the total number of taxpayers matches that given 
by HMRC (i.e. an increase of 7% in the EUROMOD statistic). The middle panel in the table 
shows that this has the effect of reducing the overall shortfall in taxable income and tax 
revenue by almost half but does little to rectify the shortfalls in the top income group. The 
effect on tax revenue in each income group is shown by the pale grey bars in the Figure. This 
                                                 
36
 We do not pursue this second possibility further. 
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suggests that a general tendency to under-report is part of the explanation for the shortfall in 
tax revenue but not the whole story.  
A second adjustment accounts for the shortfall in taxpayers within each income group. The 
effect of this is shown by the darker-grey bar in the figure and the bottom panel in the table. 
The overall shortfall in taxable income all but disappears but tax revenue is over-estimated by 
5%. The shortfall in taxable income in the top income group is greatly reduced to 11% while 
tax revenue almost matches that in HMRC statistics for this group. The remaining shortfall in 
taxable income at the top suggests that there is a problem of lack of response by high income 
earners. The relative over-estimation of tax revenue suggests that the simulation of tax 
liability is missing the effect of some tax reliefs and deductions that cannot be simulated due 
to lack of information in the data. Tax evasion is also a possible explanation. From the figure, 
it seems that these effects are more important at higher incomes.  
To summarise, the validation exercise of the simulated income tax in the UK component of 
EUROMOD provides some useful insights that should be considered in interpreting 
microsimulation results for other countries as well, although of course the specific 
explanations may differ and additional factors may be present. The UK FRS data appear to 
(a) under-represent people with high taxable incomes, and (b) under-report taxable incomes 
to some degree, across the whole distribution, although in countries characterised by large tax 
evasion the taxable income reported in the survey can be larger than the one reported in the 
tax revenue statistics. Simulated tax liabilities do not match tax revenue statistics because of 
between-year adjustments. The income tax simulations do not take account of all reliefs and 
deductions, nor of tax evasion, and this may lead to over-estimation of tax payments 
particularly towards the top of the distribution.  
  
